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Abstract
The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) represent a unique subset of the
Arab world, with many common cultural, political, and economic characteristics. This research
project is designed to assess the prospects for future democratization in these oil-rich
monarchies. Contrary to many other Arab States, these nations have several advantages that
bode well for future liberalization, including small, highly educated populations and vast
resources. Several have young, progressive-minded rulers who are competing against each other
regionally to be more modern and prestigious and enjoy increased influence. Further, these
rulers face tremendous pressure to create jobs and opportunity for their extremely young
population. Although most of the G.C.C. rulers will resist sharing power for as long as possible,
there is every reason to believe that in order to survive they will have to allow greater political
participation. And because they enjoy substantial legitimacy among the people, this opening is
more likely to result in greater democratization, not radical Islamist takeover. To be fair, there is
certainly a wide range of potential among these states: Oman and Saudi Arabia lag far behind
their neighbors, while Kuwait and Qatar have gone farther than the others in increasing
participation and accountability in their political systems. There is good reason to be optimistic
about the prospects for democratization over the long-term for the G.C.C., a fact which should
not be missed simply because they are traditional monarchies.

iv

Introduction
The prospect of democratization among the Arab countries of the Middle East has long
been a topic of particular interest for both policy-makers and political scientists. For policymakers, especially recent American administrations, this interest has been based on the belief
that a more liberal and free Middle East would be better for U.S. interests. For many political
scientists, the topic of interest has been the resistance of the region to the kinds of
democratizations taking place in other parts of the world (Bellin 2004). Most of the comparative
work on political change and democratization has either ignored the region or dismissed it as
hopeless (Nonneman 2001). A great deal of the area studies work has been profiles of particular
countries, with little general theorization. This disconnect has led to a kind of schism in the
discipline, with scholars of democracy excluding the Middle East in their own theory-building,
and with area studies experts largely ignoring theory in their case studies. This separation has
benefited neither side and is part of why there is still so much work to be done.
Michael L. Ross addresses this problem implicitly by encouraging
scholars who study democracy to incorporate the Middle East into their analyses.
Many ‘global’ studies of democratization have avoided the Mideast entirely.
Influential studies by Przeworski and Limongi and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub,
and Limongi simply drop the oil-rich Mideast states from their database. There
is, however, no sound analytical reason for scholars of democracy to exclude
these states from their research, and doing so can only weaken any general
findings. It also tends to marginalize the field of Middle East studies (2001, p.
328).
This paper is designed to integrate the best of what the democratization literature has to
offer with particular cases and insights derived from the Middle East. Specifically, I will make a
case for optimism: there is reason to believe that some Arab countries are likely to further
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democratize in the coming decades. The six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council1 represent
the most likely source of this change, and provide a unique set of cases to examine.
This argument is not without controversy, and many scholars take a different view.
Many argue that hope is in short supply when it comes to prospects for change and improvement
in Arab political systems. A long history of disappointment and backsliding has conditioned a
healthy skepticism in the political science and policy-making community. A great deal of the
disagreement among experts and scholars on this issue is rooted in the different approaches,
variables, and theories used to analyze the Arab World. A key question is whether the region is
suitable for comparison with other areas of the world. I argue that although the Mideast is
sufficiently different to warrant exploring other, unique ways of studying its particular path to
democratization, it is also useful to consider its progress (or lack thereof) within the traditional
theoretical frameworks.
The key to this analysis will be in understanding the ways in which the Gulf monarchies
are like each other and different from other Arab states. Considering them as a special subset of
countries in the region is already standard practice among many scholars for this reason. These
petro-monarchies have certain key features in common. They are first, ruled by absolute
monarchs and governed primarily by the royal family. Second, they are (to greater or lesser
degrees) dependent on oil production for their income. Third, they have small populations, and
even smaller numbers of full-fledged citizens. Fourth, they are traditional in nature, with
authority deriving from tribal culture and Islam. And fifth, they are all members of a single
alliance, the Gulf Cooperation Council. Sulayman Khalaf notes that
the dominant features that underpin Arab Gulf societies are as one societal type
far outweigh those that create diversity. To wit, they all share a similar climate
and ecology, common history, language, demographic features, religion and
1

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
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culture. Moreover, they found themselves recently possessing huge oil reserves.
The export of this treasure has brought about great prosperity, which in turn has
generated similar transformations, development, and challenges. . . .In less than
half a century, oil wealth brought somewhat uniformly broad transformations to
the Arab Gulf’s entire way of life (2006, p.245).
All of these commonalities suggest that the G.C.C. countries are highly comparable, apples and
apples, in other words, as opposed to the oranges of the rest of the region.
The path ahead for the Persian Gulf monarchies is neither preordained nor easily
discernible. The end result may not be something readily recognizable to most democratization
scholars. However, the argument to be made in this paper is that if democratization is likely to
proceed anywhere in the Middle East, it will be in the G.C.C.; further, these countries are more
likely to continue to reform, albeit slowly and gradually, rather than regress. The Gulf States
have generated considerable excitement among democracy-promoters because of the
increasingly important role that elections and parliaments play in these regimes (Stepan and
Robertson 2003). This is not to say that the process will be even or without setbacks; recent
history cautions against such blind optimism. Yet each of these countries is facing certain
pressures and is armed with certain resources and options to deal with them. The potential for
further reform is there, as are substantial pressures that these regimes will be forced to confront
in the coming years.
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Review of Relevant Literature
One of the most vexing puzzles for policy-makers and political scientists alike has been
the lack of any real democracy in the Arab world. Part of what makes the Middle East so
unusual in this respect is that democratization and liberalization are increasing in every other
area of the world. According to both Freedom House and the Polity IV project, every region of
the world has shown marked improvement in average levels of democracy except the Middle
East (Weiffen 2004).
This resistance to democratization has been characterized as a “democracy gap,” and
scholars have offered numerous explanations for the region’s authoritarian entrenchment (Stepan
and Roberston 2003; Karatnycky 2002). Some have focused on the commonality of Islam to all
of these countries, positing that somehow the Islamic faith was incompatible with or detrimental
to democracy (Sarsar 2000). These theories pointed to the assumed authoritarian nature of Islam,
the all-encompassing nature of the religion (providing guidance for all aspects of life) and lack of
separation between the religious and the political (Sarsar 2000; Karatnycky 2002). Additionally,
to the extent that Islam is seen as a force in the subjugation of women, it conflicts with the
establishment of full human rights necessary for democracy (Fish 2002). These arguments,
which are rooted in the sort of cultural critique offered by Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations,” have been widely criticized and refuted by the majority of scholars (Huntington
1993; Anderson 2006; Zakaria 2004).
These counter-arguments focus one of the following--either that Islam is indeed
compatible with democracy or that the trouble is not Islam but the Arab Islamic world. Brigitte
Weiffen has argued that it is only a certain interpretation of Islam which has been useful in
sustaining autocratic rule (2004). Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao claim that there is a wide
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variety of interpretation occurring within Islam, and that some of these interpretations even
explicitly support democracy (2005). Fareed Zakaria argues that searching the Koran for clues
to Islam’s true nature is unhelpful because of all the inherent contradictions and historicallygrounded guidelines. Rather, he makes the case that Islam actually has anti-authoritarian bent,
citing the Prophet Mohammed’s command to disobey any ruler who asks you to violate the
Muslim faith (2004). He goes on to claim that it is in fact a lack of central clerical authority
which has allowed radicals such as Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda to offer competing
interpretations of Islam which are often the most hostile to democracy.
And yet, one scholar found a seeming connection between Islamist countries and lack of
democracy. In his cross-national study of Islam and regime type, Steven Fish found support for
the argument that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers (2002). He offers the
subjugation of women as the key mechanism by which Islam inhibits democratization, although
he acknowledges that this is due to misinterpretation of the scriptures of Islam (2002). Daniela
Donno and Bruce Russett take issue with Fish’s emphasis on cultural explanations for the
democracy gap in the Middle East. In their 2004 article, “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Female
Empowerment: What are the Linkages?” they replicate and modify Fish’s tests and arrive at
different findings and conclusions. While Fish’s central point about Islamic countries being less
democratic holds, Donno and Russett find evidence that it is Arab Islamic countries in which this
finding is most robust. Indeed, a number of scholars and studies have pointed out that the nonArab Muslim world has actually fared quite well with regard to democratization (Stepan and
Robertson 2003). Zakaria has pointed out that of the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, only
about 260 million of them live in the Middle East. He cites Indonesia and India (more than 120
million Muslims) as an example of how Islam can coexist with democracy (2004). He also
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agrees that it is clearly the Arab world with the problem: “of the twenty-two members of the
Arab League, not one is an electoral democracy, whereas 63 percent of all the countries in the
world are” (2004, p. 7). Additionally, opinion polls taken in the Arab world consistently show
popular support for participatory democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005).
Also at issue is the nature of democracy itself. Does democracy mean the same thing in
different places and across varied contexts? Is it historically and temporally grounded in the
West and Euro-American experience? Are there absolute requirements or is the concept more
flexible? There seems to be a normative consensus that democracy is a good form of
government; the disagreement has been exactly what constitutes democracy (Diamond 2002).
For example, is secularism necessary for democracy? It has been the path of the liberal
democracies of the West, but this is not a given with regard to other regions.
Is democracy an “either/or” proposition, or are there degrees of democracy? A number
of definitions have been offered, including Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” (1971). His conception of
democracy requires free, fair and competitive elections, as well as various personal freedoms,
institutions, and organizations needed to ensure the spirit (not just letter) of democratic
government. The measures used by Freedom House are essentially based on this type of
definition (Fish 2002). Others have proposed more minimalist standards. Joseph Schumpeter’s
definition requires only that the ‘principal positions of power are filled ‘through a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote’” (1947, p. 269). However, more and more regimes are adopting
the trappings of democracy (regular, competitive, multiparty elections) while neglecting or
sabotaging the substance of democracy (Diamond 2002). This has led scholars to offer a number
of new classification schemes for regimes which are not purely authoritarian or purely
democratic. It has also engendered debate about the myriad ways in which democracy might
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manifest itself in different countries: while pluralism is considered necessary for a modern
Islamic democracy, secularism is not. Tessler and Gao’s survey found that while support for
democracy is widespread in the Arab world, only about half favor secular democracy. The other
half prefer a system which is both democratic and guided by Islamic principles (2005).
In addition to debates on the definitions of democracy, many scholars have also
emphasized the difference between procedural, electoral democracy and true liberal democracy.
The first depends primarily on free, fair, and competitive elections. The second has proven more
elusive, because it involves other aspects of society, such as rule of law, accountability, freedom
of information and public debate, protection of minorities, and empowerment of women, among
others. This difference is important to remember because most authoritarian regimes hold some
sort of elections (Schedler 2002). Free and fair elections are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for democracy. The result of elections in authoritarian regimes is often strikingly
illiberal policies (Herb 2003). If elections are held before liberal society has developed, the
prime beneficiary is often the Islamist opposition which is organizationally and operationally in
the best position to capitalize on the opportunity (Ben-Meir 2006). To give an example, it was
Kuwait’s elected parliament which voted down the king’s decree giving women the right to vote
in 2005 (and then subsequently approved it two weeks later).
So what then is to be made of these hybrid regimes, which exhibit both authoritarian and
democratic features? Some scholars have offered new terms such as “electoral
authoritarianism,” “pseudodemocracy,” and “illiberal democracy” designed to represent the wide
variety of forms non-liberal regimes can take (Diamond 2002; Zakaria 1997). Other analysts
insist that “partial compliance with democratic norms does not add up to partial democracy. . . If
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the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, elections become not less democratic but
undemocratic” (Schedler 2002, p. 41).
Another common path in the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East is for the regime to
permit some political liberalization to occur while thwarting attempts to increase political
participation and democratization. For the purposes of this discussion, keeping the two
processes (liberalization and democratization) separate is important, for the represent two
complementary yet distinct paths for regime manipulation or reform. Jamil E. Jreisat, Jr. (2006)
cites Brynen, Korany, and Noble’s definition of liberalization as involving the
expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil and
political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage
in free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interest
whereas democratization is the “expansion of political participation in such a way as to provide
citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over policy” (Brynen, Korany,
and Noble 1995). This difference will figure prominently in the following discussions of present
and future reforms in the Arab Middle East, because many countries are using liberalization as a
way to manage pressures for democratization (Lucas 2004).
A number of different theories about how and when societies democratize exist in the
comparative politics literature. Each specifies certain variables, conditions, influences, and
pathways that lead a regime to become democratic. In the case of the Middle East, explanations
have out of necessity focused on explaining why democracy has not occurred. The logic is that
if the requisite conditions or variables are absent, democratization will not occur. Which factors
are both necessary and sufficient, however, is a matter of great debate. In order to explain why
the Middle East has not democratized, as well as why authoritarianism has persisted, scholars
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have employed a number of different democratization paradigms. The major theories and their
application to the countries of the Arab world are reviewed here.
The political change that took place across the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s
has led to a large and growing body of literature. Most theories focus on either “prerequisites”
for democracy (necessary conditions for democratization to begin) or “transitions,” which
highlight the strategic choices of key actors, especially the regime elites and the opposition
(Posusney 2005). Looking first at the transitions paradigm, for example, democracy can be
expected to develop when regime hardliners and challengers come to see democracy as the best
(or, least bad) option for furthering their interests (Posusney 2005). Thus, a focus on human
agency and the behavior of key actors provides a theory for how and when democracy emerges.
Largely based on research into the third wave of democratization, some have also suggested that
splits within the ruling coalitions and opposition groups may help to determine the existence and
form of political transitions (Lust-Okar, n.d.). Others like Juan Linz have pointed to the
importance of leadership and its ability to create conditions favorable or unfavorable to
democratization (1990). Much of this ties into the theories of mobilization, which emphasize the
important role played by opposition leaders in creating and constructing the necessary vision and
resources to force change upon reluctant elites.
What do these ideas about democratization tell us about why the Middle East has not
democratized, and why authoritarianism in the region has remained so robust? One reason why
transitions have not occurred has been a lack of motivation on the part of Arab leaders. The
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East have proven remarkably resistant to pressures for
reform. Additionally, these regimes have been very adept at ensuring the fragmentation and
weakness of opposition groups, who are therefore not in a strong position to challenge them
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(Cook 2005). Having established the institutions and rules of the game in these authoritarian
regimes, elites are able to manipulate the system to best serve their interests. They regularly
deny many important political freedoms, especially the freedom of the press and assembly. This
makes it all that much harder for any substantial challenger group to emerge and threaten the
rulers. In other words, when it comes to agency theories, Middle Eastern autocrats are not
motivated to change and opposition groups are too weak and divided to pose a real threat.
The transitions paradigm is not without its critics. Thomas Carothers, in an article
entitled “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” attacks some of the assumptions of the theory; for
example, the notion that any country moving away from dictatorship must be also moving
toward democracy (2002). Transition theorists tend to see democratization as a single path, and
while a particular country may progress or regress, the paradigm assumes linear process.
Carothers argues that transitionists also wrongly overvalue elections for their own sake,
minimize the importance of the specific cultural and economic conditions of the country, and
mistakenly assume that these countries are fully-functional states. These misunderstandings, he
claims, help explain why the transition paradigm so drastically overpredicts democratization, and
also why so few countries have lived up to the hopes of the third wave transition scholars
(Carothers 2002). Indeed, Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger have argued that the poor
fit of the transition paradigm and the Middle East is largely why Arab countries have been
neglected from the general theoretical literature (2004). For this reason, Frederic Volpi believes
that any democratization (or lack thereof) in the Muslim world is “more meaningfully presented
as a sui generis phenomenon rather than as an instance of Latin American or Eastern European
‘third wave’ democratization” (2004, p. 1062).
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Other scholars have turned to modernization theory, which instead focuses on the
necessary economic, cultural, and social conditions for democratization to occur. Modernization
theory posits a link between economic development and political development: as societies
modernize and undergo industrialization, they are more likely to become democratic (see Lipset
1959 or Inglehart 1997). The higher living standards resulting from modernization lead to a
number of important changes, such as the development of a middle class, increased openness and
participation, rising levels of education, and ultimately more accountable and representative
government. Richard N. Haass argues that “market-based economic modernization helps usher
in elements of democracy—the rule of law, transparent decision-making, the free exchange of
ideas—which in turn sustain and accelerate economic growth” (2003, p. 146). Whether they
explicitly endorse all the implications of modernization theory or not, many scholars implicitly
accept many of its premises. For example, studies of democracy in the Middle East often look at
variables such as per-capita and median-income, urbanization, women’s rights,
telecommunications availability, education, and employment statistics. All of these are
essentially proxies for various aspects of modernization theory. A number of studies have found
links between some of these factors and level of political openness in a society, even in the
normally problematic Middle East (The World Bank 2003; Hofheinz 2005; Winckler 2002; Ross
2004; Ross 2001; Donno and Russett 2004; Fish 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; Stepan and
Robertson 2003).
Overall, however, the research on modernization theory is inconclusive. Low levels of
education and literacy have not blocked progress towards better participatory governance in
Africa and South Asia (The World Bank 2003). Alan Richards points out that India has proven
to be a thorny exception to the development equals democracy rule, and that current levels of
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education and urbanization in the Middle East are “certainly high enough to guarantee a vibrant
democracy—if the critical barriers can be overcome” (2005, p. 32). The history of Western
democratization has shown the importance of a viable middle class in modernizing societies.
Vickie Langhor, however, disputes the conventional wisdom that middle classes will lead to
voter moderation and political openings. She points out that several Arab countries have middle
classes, and when given the opportunity they often vote for conservative Islamic parties—not
liberal reformers (2002).
Perhaps the most effective critique of modernization theory is that many countries in the
Arab World are not poor. In fact, some of the Gulf monarchies are very wealthy. And yet, these
countries have not experienced the kind of liberal transformation modernization theory
associates with rising wealth and living standards. In response to this discrepancy, rentier theory
has emerged to explain why rich, petroleum-based economies do not conform to the expected
democracy and development paradigm. Rentierism is one of the main contributions by Middle
East scholars to the general social science literature (Anderson 2006).
The central idea of rentierism is that in an oil-based system, the primary function of the
state (as opposed to in normal economies) is distributive, not extractive. Oil rich states do not
need to tax their populations for income; rather, they have independent, outside sources of
revenue which they have sole discretion in spending. A number of propositions emerge from
this framework. Because citizens of petro-states pay no taxes (and indeed benefit from nearly
cradle to grave welfare in some cases) they have no grounds upon which to make demands for
political participation. This is essentially a “no representation without taxation” argument, and is
expected to result in a politically inactive and quiescent population (Okruhlik 1999; Crystal
2005). For those who would be inclined to oppose the regime, there are many options available
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to the state due to its oil largesse and independence. Opposition elements may be bought off, coopted, or coerced into submission. Population loyalty is likewise purchased with state jobs,
security, free healthcare and education, and other benefits reserved for citizens (Gause 1994).
Additionally, the nature of oil-based economies is such that other economic interests are weak
and have no large base of support. The economy is dominated by the state, not economic and
business elites. The result of all these factors is the overwhelming security of the regime. With
the freedom, power, and independence oil revenue provides, the rulers of these countries have
been able to minimize opposition and maximize the regime’s security. Oil serves as a kind of
lubrication when societal pressures begin to mount.
A number of scholars have tried to quantitatively test the propositions of rentier theory.
The most widely cited scholar on this topic is Michael Ross and his 2001 study “Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?” Ross used pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971
and 1997 to test three hypothesized mechanisms for oil impeding democracy. The three
mechanisms were a) rentierism, whereby low taxes and high spending reduce pressure on the
regime to democratize, b) repression, by which governments spend extensively on domestic
security to suppress dissent, and c) modernization theory, which points to the failure of the
workforce to modernize, making them less likely to demand reform (Ross 2001). His results
lend support to all three mechanisms, and he argues that the interaction of the three may lead to a
“resource trap” (2001). His argument is not deterministic; rather, he claims that oil or other vast
mineral wealth makes is more difficult for a country to democratize. Some states were lucky
enough to have established democracy before the discovery of oil, such as the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway. Others have managed to make the difficult transition to
democracy despite the oil curse, namely Indonesia and Mexico. The situation remains, however,
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that for the vast majority of countries, oil wealth has proven to be deleterious to both democratic
reform and economic development (Schubert 2006).
In a related article, Ross also tests the effect of taxation on representation. He finds that
it is not higher taxes per se that cause people to demand more representation, but rather higher
taxes without a commensurate increase in the level of services (2004). Weiffen argues that it is
the confluence of oil wealth and Islamic culture which produce the most anti-democratic
pressure. Her quantitative analysis confirms that the combination of oil wealth and Islam
produces a higher anti-democratic effect than either alone or even added together. It is the
interaction effect between the two which makes democratization so difficult (2004). Indra de
Soysa argues that empirical evidence for mineral resources being a curse is quite strong, and her
findings show that oil resources and dependency accurately predicts lower levels of physical
integrity rights (2005). A number of other scholars have also found evidence to support the
rentier argument, including Kristopher W. Ramsay (2006), Kevin K. Tsui (2005), Ricky Lam
and Leonard Wantchekon (2002), Benjamin Smith (2006), and Leonard Wantchekon (2002).
Rentier theory is not without its detractors. Michael Herb has argued that even people
who don’t pay taxes can still be expected to want good and prudent governance, and that “the
formula ‘No representation without taxation,’ needs a decent burial (1999, p. 259). Gregory
Gause III has also supported the idea that citizens of oil-wealthy regimes also want some
accountability in their government; he also claims that these trends are increasing. According to
Gause, this is due to an increase (since the 1970s and 1980s) in the size and role of the central
government, and a younger generation which is starting to take social benefits as a right of
citizenship, not a generous gift from the regime (1994). Gause concludes that rentier regimes
(especially in the Gulf States) will likely face even greater pressure in the future, and the
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depoliticization of the population (proposed by rentier theory) is unlikely to last indefinitely
(1994).
Gwenn Okruhlik is also a critic of rentier theory, mainly because it seemingly ignores or
neglects the role of human agency. She argues that just because a country is rich in oil does not
mean it will have a quiescent population; rather, “oil states often foster their own civil opposition
because of the way revenues are deployed” (1999, p. 295). She argues that “no necessary link
exists between the accumulation of wealth and a particular social outcome” (1999, p. 295). For
her analysis, she attempts to integrate rentier conditions with personalistic rule to explain the
political outcomes of oil-rich states. She points out that the governments of the G.C.C.
monarchies have opposition groups, in contrast to the expectations of rentierism that they would
not (1999). However, for the most part these groups are weak, divided, and ineffective agents of
opposition to the government. She also argues that inequality in the distribution of oil wealth
benefits both creates an opposition and provides them with the necessary resources to oppose the
government (1999). What she fails to note is that the most dramatic inequality in distribution
occurs between citizens and non-citizens (often foreigners). Members of the non-citizen outgroup have virtually no rights or privileges, and they are often foreign laborers who are striving
to send money back to their home country. These people are unlikely to develop or sustain any
real resistance to the regime. Rather, by bestowing benefits so generously upon legitimate
citizens, the regime may create a stronger sense of solidarity and attachment to the ruler.
There are still other theories about how and why democratization occurs, and why it has
not occurred in the Arab world. One such theory points to the weakness of civil society in the
Middle East. Based on the work of Alexis de Toqueville and Robert Putnam, some scholars
have argued that liberal democracy requires a strong and active civil society, and therefore the
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persistence of authoritarianism can be explained by a weak or absent civil society (Lust-Okar
n.d.; The World Bank 2003). However, there is disagreement as to whether civil society is both
necessary and sufficient. For example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that civil society is
tremendously helpful but not enough on its own to produce democratic transition. They claim
that for that to occur, civil society needs to be transformed into “political society,” which they
define as “that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right
to exercise control over power and the state apparatus” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 8). In other
words, while civil society may be capable of destroying a non-democratic regime, only political
society can produce democratic transition and consolidation (1996). This transformation has
largely not occurred in the Middle East, due in great part to the repressive policies of the state.
In order for civil associations to play the helpful role they have in other transitions to democracy,
they must find a way to engage a state-dependent middle-class and develop a stronger base of
power capable of challenging the state (Kamrava 2005).
Others have claimed that perhaps civic associations in “non-democratic settings [do not]
foster the same attitudes toward democratic governance and social capital that they do in
democracies” (Lust-Okar n.d.). The logic here is that in a non-democracy, citizens fail to
develop the necessary attitudes and trust required for a functioning, pluralistic democracy. On
the other hand, Nicola Pratt has argued that the reason why Arab societies have not democratized
is not because civil society actors do not support democracy, but because they cannot agree on
what democracy should look like or how to create it (Pratt 2007). Pratt believes that civil society
must wage a “war of position” against authoritarianism, challenging its socioeconomic,
ideological, and institutional structures (2007, p. 189).
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Many scholars have defined civil society so as not to include political parties (Stepan
1988). Langhor makes the argument that the rise of single-issue advocacy groups, rather than
political parties, has impeded democratization in several liberalizing Arab regimes (2005). In
other words, the key secular opposition in these countries is not the politically vital party but
rather a more politically neutral NGO. The impotence of political parties in the Arab World has
led Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid to suggest that because they stand no chance of capturing power,
they are not functionally different from issue-oriented civil society groups (and ought to be
treated as such) (Posusney 2005).
The above argument points to the difficulty of studying civil society in the Arab context.
This lack of consensus is but one of the problems with the civil society thesis for studying
democratic change in the Middle East, according to Sean L. Yom (2005). He claims that any
growth of civil society is more likely a function of autocratic strategy rather than a threat to it.
“Arab states have leveraged a cyclical strategy of liberalization-repression to control swells of
civic activism” and remain “robust in their will and capacity to repress” (2005, p. 1). While he
believes that civil society is still an important topic for study, he cautions against prescribing it as
a cure for the autocratic ills of Arab societies. He also points to the failure of civil society
organizations to mobilize substantial support throughout society and to work together in
coalitions for mutual benefit. Finally, he draws attention to the difficulty of accounting for the
rise of Islamist organizations and their implications for theories about (secular) civil society.
Because Islamist parties fail to fit the traditional mold of other civil groups, many analysts ignore
their potential. Yom’s argument is that Arab civil society is fundamentally different and more
complex than most scholars assume, and is therefore the civil society thesis is bound to fail if
applied to these countries (2005, p. 8).
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While a great deal of resources and energy has been spent by the West, especially the US,
on supporting civil society groups across the Middle East, the results have been uneven at best.
According to Carothers, the international aid community has relied on a relatively standardized
institutional checklist for promoting democracy in various countries—judicial reform, civil
society assistance, civic education, support for political parties, and strengthening of parliament,
to name a few (Carothers 2002). Stephen Cook offers a critique of this limited approach.
‘The reason that the promotion of civil society, economic development and
sanctions have not led to political reform in the Arab world’ he argued, ‘is that
none of them addresses the real obstacles to change in the region: flawed
institutions’ (2005, p. 94).
Whether in democracies or autocracies, a new generation of scholars (often labeled the “new
institutionalists”) has argued for the importance of institutions in determining and conditioning
political outcomes. In short, institutions matter (Lust-Okar 2005).
Institutions include both formal organizations and informal rules and routines that
structure political activity. This can mean everything from electoral rules to tribal customs in
society. Institutions vary across countries, and thus require careful attention to their unique role
in each context. In the Arab world, for example, a common way of organizing society is along
traditional familial lines, with networks of patronage and kinship linking the government to the
people, and the people to each other. These specific arrangements affect and influence the way
in which a society evolves politically. While authoritarian regimes demonstrate less respect for
the rule of law than democracies, they are still shaped by very real and important institutional
features. The nature of opposition in a given country depends largely on the rules imposed upon
its formation and operation by the government (Lust-Okar 2005). Whether through coercion or
cooptation, authoritarian regimes have become quite adept at influencing the nature of opposition
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groups as well as their relations among themselves. This directly affects the potential for
cooperation among opposition groups, thus also affecting their potential impact.
It is perhaps this ability of regimes to influence potential opposition forces which has
helped prevent substantial democratization in the region. It is no coincidence that autocratic
rulers of the Middle East enjoy vastly more power than any oppositional groups. As Ellen LustOkar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal point out, “the formation of electoral institutions depends on
the preferences and power of the actors involved, and more powerful players can force the
creation of institutions that suit their preference” (2002, p. 346). Because institutions shape
political outcomes, Arab governments can largely prevent or minimize any major threat to their
rule. As such, institutions are an important part of the puzzle of the absence of democracy in the
Arab world.
A final theory that purports to explain the absence of democracy in the Middle East
(specifically in the monarchic regimes) has been offered by Herb (1999). He distinguishes
between two types of monarchy: those in which the royal family forms a ruling institution, and
those in which the monarch rules alone. In the first type, which he labels “dynastic monarchy,”
members of the ruling family control all the major offices and ministries, and have solid
mechanisms for power distribution and dispute resolution, especially regarding succession. In
the second type, the monarch enjoys absolute power and independence from the royal family.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are examples of the former, while Iran under the Shah represents the
latter. Herb’s theory, backed by persuasive case studies, is that dynastic regimes are more stable
and resilient than personalistic ones (Nonneman 2001). He points out that no dynastic regime in
the Middle East has been toppled by revolution, while all of the absolute monarchs have been
ousted (Herb 1999, p. 8-9).
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Herb constructs a compelling case for how the specific strengths of dynastic monarchies
have enabled them to survive and even thrive despite rising pressures for reform. As he puts it,
“the institutions of dynastic monarchism incorporate incentives that drive individual prices and
shaykhs, in their pursuit of power, to take actions which contribute to the maintenance of family
domination over the state” (1999, p. 45). In other words, the ruling family makes sure that every
member has a stake in the system, so that success comes from working together to resolve
differences internally. Herb argues that this mechanism for managing competition and
differences among family members is what has made these regimes so strong and able to survive
where so many other monarchies have fallen. A regime which can withstand rising pressure for
reform is one which can resist democratization. Thus, monarchy is not an odd historical
anachronism in the Middle East, but a key explanatory factor in its political development.
While many scholars acknowledge the contribution made by Herb’s theory, dynastic
monarchism is not unproblematic. As Gerd Nonneman points out, “the case is not watertight,”
citing the misfit of countries like Jordan and Morocco and Herb’s dismissal of both rentier theory
and the policy choices made by rulers (2001, p. 156). Russell E. Lucas also notes that both
dynastic monarchism and rentier theory fail to consider the likely beneficial effect of small
population, with the idea that a smaller population is easier to control (2004). Yet despite these
criticisms, Nonneman acknowledges that “no examination of Middle Eastern monarchies can
henceforth afford to ignore Herb’s contribution” (2001, p. 156).
All of these theories for when, why, and how countries democratize offer some key set of
variables or conditions as more important than others. Each of the above purports to explain
why democratization has proceeded apace across every area of the world save the Middle East.
This paper does not aim to resolve these disputes. Rather, it will examine a specific subset of
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Middle Eastern cases: the petro-monarchies of the Persian Gulf. A short summary of each of the
six states will provide context for the discussion to follow. The aim of this study is to
demonstrate that despite their seeming conservative and traditional nature, the monarchic
regimes of the Persian Gulf represent the best hope for peaceful transition to more representative
and participatory government in the Arab World.
According to the preceding arguments, the possibility of democratization in the Gulf
monarchies is dim indeed. And yet, there are quite a few scholars who believe that if democracy
is to take root anywhere in the Arab world, it will likely be first in the G.C.C. states. Scholars
have begun to take note that some of the most impressive reforms and political openings have,
perhaps ironically, taken place in what many would consider the most conservative and
anachronistic of regimes, the Gulf monarchies (Rubin 2006). There has been a wave of
democratic reforms and increased political participation throughout the Gulf, but most
dramatically in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait (Kechichian 2004). Although the future of
democratization in the G.C.C. remains uncertain, there are many positive signs that profound
changes might occur.
According to Klein et al., “this is a decade of change in the Gulf region. Today you see
new policies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, but there are more to
come” (2000, p. 11). In sum, there are many aspects of the Gulf monarchies which make them
uniquely well-suited for the project of democratization, and there is good reason to be optimistic
about their future.
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The Six Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.)
Bahrain
The Kingdom of Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf near Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain has been ruled by the al Khalifa family since 1782, when it captured the island from
Persia. It was governed as a British protectorate until the 1920s. The al Khalifa are Sunni Arab
rulers of a majority Shia country (60-70% of native Bahrainis) (Bahry 2000). Its small
population of 708,573 also includes 235,108 non-nationals, mostly foreign workers who send
their earnings back to their home countries (CIA 2007).
Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa has been king of Bahrain since the death of his father in 1999.
Since acceding to the throne, Sheikh Hamad has revived elections for municipal councils and
instituted a number of reforms. His first act was to release political prisoners, allow the return of
exiles, and eliminate emergency laws and courts. In 2001, he offered a new National Charter
designed to create a constitutional monarchy with a partially elected parliament. Voters of
Bahrain (all men and women over age twenty) approved the charter by a wide majority, but were
ultimately disappointed in the pace and incompleteness of the reforms (Freedom House 2007).
Women were voting and standing as candidates for the first time, and although no women won,
the king appointed six to the advisory chamber. And yet the Sheikh’s commitment to improving
democracy in Bahrain underscores an awareness of the popular basis of monarchic authority
(Kirby 2000). Since then, progress toward greater openness and political participation has been
mixed. Formal political parties are still banned, but some other charitable and professional
groupings are allowed. There is still substantial discontent among the majority Shia population,
some of whose groups boycotted the recent elections.

22

Bahrain has the smallest petroleum reserves of any of the G.C.C. countries, so it is
actively pursuing the diversification and privatization of its economy to reduce the country's
dependence on oil. Bahrain was the first Gulf State to develop comprehensive labor reform for
developing the skills of its own workers. In August of 2006, Bahrain and the US signed a free
trade agreement, the first between the US and a Gulf state.
Kuwait
Kuwait is a desert kingdom located at the north end of the Persian Gulf, roughly the size
of New Jersey. It has been ruled by the al Sabah family for more than 200 years (prior to 1961
under British protection). The current ruler, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah took over
the throne in 2006. Kuwait is the only Arab state in the Gulf with an elected legislature; the
National Assembly also enjoys substantial independence from regime control, though it has been
shut down by the ruling family on several occasions (Polity IV 2003). The greatest crisis in
Kuwaiti history occurred when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded the kingdom in August of 1990,
whereupon the royal family was forced to flee. Since returning to power in 1991, the al Sabah
family has permitted increased participation in governance. The parliament has successfully
blocked legislation proposed by the government (most notably suffrage for women prior to 2005)
and forced the resignation of government ministers (Freedom House 2007).
Kuwait is a small, wealthy nation with about 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves, with
oil exports accounting for almost 90% of state income (Freedom House 2007). About half of its
2.5 million people are non-nationals (or native non-citizens) (CIA 2007). Kuwait is arguably the
most modern and most open society in the Persian Gulf area; the government allows some open
criticism and debate on politics, and both men and women can own property and establish
businesses (Freedom House 2007). According to Herb, the system in Kuwait is “not democracy,
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but neither is it absolutism: it is akin to the constitutional monarchies of nineteenth-century
Europe” (Herb 1999, p. 168).
Oman
The modern history of Oman begins in 1970, when Qabus bin Said Al Said overthrew his
conservative, isolationist father in a bloodless palace coup. The Sandhurst-educated Sultan
Qaboos launched an extensive modernization program designed to improve Oman’s
infrastructure, educational system, government, and economy. His reforms began to pay off by
the 1980s, when a dramatic spike in world oil prices permitted the government to create the
necessary structures of a modern state and improve the quality of life of the Omani people.
Considering the challenges Oman faced, its progress has been remarkable. J. E. Peterson notes
that
Oman has accomplished as much or more than its fellow Gulf monarchies, despite
starting from scratch considerably later, having less oil income to utilize, dealing
with a larger and more rugged geography, and resolving a bitter civil war [the
Dhufari rebellion] along the way (2004, p. 125).
By the 1990s, this socioeconomic progress was accompanied by measures increasing
political participation and constitutional reform. In 1991, Sultan Qabus created the 59-seat (later
83) Consultative Council, with appointed members giving their opinions to the king. Then, in
1996, he transformed the Council into an elected body, though only a small section of society
was allowed to vote until 2003, when all male and female Omanis were granted suffrage. Since
then, women have won seats in both houses of the parliament. Still, the Council has no
legislative powers and the sultan retains absolute control over government and issues laws by
royal decree.
Oman has made great strides in economic reform as well. Oil generally represents about
75% of Oman’s revenues, though its reserves are relatively small and dwindling (Freedom House
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2007). As a result, the government has made an effort to diversify the economy, liberalize its
business practices, and reduce its dependence on oil exports (Freedom House 2007). Oman
joined the World Trade Organization in 2000 and signed a free trade agreement with the US in
2006. It has also hosted US military forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Despite all the great changes and improvements in Oman in the last 30 years, there are
other problems on the horizon. Peterson notes that Oman’s very young population largely does
not remember the hard times before 1970, and are not as complacent as their fathers’ generation.
Rather, they are concerned about “rising levels of unemployment, dwindling natural resources—
most significantly, water—Oman’s future after oil, and what will happen when the heirless
Sultan Qabus passes from the scene” (Peterson 2004, p. 126). Some have even argued that
Sultan Qabus “may be the last of the sultans,” and that he is preparing the country to become
some sort of republic (Kechichian 2004, p. 44). In any case, much will depend on how Oman’s
political system handles the uncertainty and challenges of the next few decades. And yet, there
is reason to be hopeful. Joseph A. Kechichian claims that “over time, the sultan, or perhaps his
successor, will probably emerge as the first constitutional monarch on the Arabian Peninsula”
(2004, p. 44).
Qatar
Qatar is a peninsula jutting out from Saudi Arabia into the Persian Gulf, where the al
Thani family has ruled since 1916—although Qatar has only had its independence since 1971.
As in Oman, the king was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his son. Following his accession in
1995, the new Emir, Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, began a new program of reform and
modernization (also similar to the case in Oman). Unlike Oman, however, Emir Hamad is still
relatively young (56) and likely to be in power for quite a while. He took two important steps
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toward greater openness when he dissolved the Ministry of Information and launched the
satellite news network al Jazeera in 1996. Al Jazeera has become one of the most respected Arab
news sources, and its success has greatly increased the profile of the tiny nation around the
world. In fact, Qatar has attempted to act much larger than its size as a key player and broker in
international affairs (Bahry and Marr 2005).
The emir has maintained that democracy is the way forward for his country (Ford 2006).
In 1999, women were given the right to vote and stand for office; Qatar also had the Gulf’s first
female minister. The emir’s wife, Mozah bint Nasser al Misnad, has played an important role in
improving conditions for Qatari women (especially education) and setting an example for
modern Gulf women (Bahry and Marr 2005). In 2002, the emir sponsored the creation of a draft
constitution, later approved by 97% of voters, which widened the space for political participation
while maintaining the al Thani’s position as absolute rulers (Owen 2000).
Economically, Qatar has fared rather well due to substantial oil reserves. Oil and gas
(some of the largest liquid natural gas (LNG) reserves in the world) together account for more
than 70% of government revenues (CIA 2007). Though it has secure resources for at least the
next few decades, Qatar has also worked to liberalize and diversify its economy. It ranks 35th in
the world in per capita income ($ 29,800); among the six G.C.C. states, it is second only to the
United Arab Emirates (CIA 2007)2. Its small population also means that despite the burdens of
financing a full welfare state, the Qatari regime also has enough excess funding to pursue other
development projects. One of the most notable is called Education City—a 300$ million dollar
branch campus which attracts top quality Western universities from around the world, enabling
Qataris to enjoy high quality education without having to go abroad (Ford 2006).
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Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is an oil-rich, conservative monarchy, home to two of Islam’s holiest cities,
Mecca and Medina. It has been ruled by the al Saud family with support from the al Wahhab
clergy since 1932, when the kingdom was created. The current king, Abdullah, officially
ascended in 2005 when then king Fahd died; in reality, he had been de facto ruler for several
years. The discovery of vast oil reserves in the 1930s marked the beginning of the tremendous
oil wealth which was to propel the traditional kingdom onto the world stage.
Indeed, one can hardly speak of Saudi Arabia without mentioning its vast petroleum
wealth. Its oil fields represent one quarter of the world’s proven reserves, and Saudi Arabia is
the world’s largest exporter of petroleum (CIA 2007). Though certainly not large by world
standards, Saudi Arabia’s population of about 27 million (with 5.5 million non-nationals) is
much larger than the other G.C.C. states (CIA 2007). Despite its greater oil wealth, the larger
population size and the expensive lifestyle and size of the Saudi royal family have led to an
overall lower standard of living for most people. Its per capita GDP, at just $13,600, is the
lowest of all the G.C.C. kingdoms (CIA 2007).
Saudi society is governed by one of the most conservative schools of Sunni Islam
(Wahhabism). There is no freedom of the press, religion, or assembly, and women are denied
many basic rights (most notably, driving). Saudi Arabia has no formal constitution; it claims the
Koran as its sole guide and Sharia as its law. As noted by organizations such as Freedom House
and others, the Saudi regime is highly repressive and permits no direct criticism of the al Saud
family (Freedom House 2007).
The stationing of US troops in Saudi territory during and after the first Persian Gulf War
proved to be a source of great unrest in the kingdom. A series of reforms in the 1990s, including
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a newly appointed Consultative Council and provincial governments, were instituted to address a
series of petitions and memorandums from both religious and secular opposition groups. The
Council was later given the power to debate and study laws proposed by the king, as well as
issue recommendations. While the king may limit debate and ignore the council’s advice, he
rarely does so. Usually some sort of accommodation is reached between the two sides
(Kapiszewski 2006). However, the power and influence of the Council should not be
overestimated.
The impact of the 9/11 attacks on Saudi Arabia were profound. Not only were 15 of the
19 hijackers Saudi nationals, so was the mastermind, Osama bin Laden. Many al-Qaeda
members were also Saudi, and they were enjoying growing influence in the Kingdom
(Kapiszewski 2006). In response to growing internal and external pressure (as well as a series of
terrorist attacks), King Abdullah made moves to crack down on radical Islamists in the country
and address calls for further reform. There was some easing of media censorship, a series of
dialogues with high-ranking officials, and discussion of having some limited form of elections.
The first elections in Saudi history were held in 2005 for municipal council. Women were not
allowed to vote and only certain men were. Only half the seats were open for election; the other
half were still appointed. Candidates had to be screened by regime officials and the government
had to give final approval to the results (Freedom House 2007). Still, the elections represented a
significant experiment for a society with no history of representative government. In addition,
the government approved National Society for Human Rights became more active and outspoken
in 2006, proposing an HIV patient bill of rights and calling for judicial reform to ensure fairer
sentences (Human Rights Watch 2007).
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United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is a loose federation of seven sheikdoms, each led by
a hereditary monarch. The seven emirs constitute the Supreme Council of Rulers, with the emirs
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai holding the positions of president and vice-president respectively, due
to their territories’ superior wealth. Though never a formal British colony, the U.A.E. (then
known as the Trucial States) was protected and represented internationally by the United
Kingdom until 1971. The current president, Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, took over upon his
father’s death in 2004.
Each sheikh governs his emirate by decree and with absolute power, although traditions
such as right to petition and consultation also exist for citizen complaints. Freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and religion are significantly restricted: there are no political parties and no
fully democratic institutions. However, in 2006 the government did approve the formation of the
first human rights organization in the country, the Emirates Human Rights Association (Human
Rights Watch 2007). The legislative council can review legislation but not veto it; however, half
its seats are elected and women are allowed to vote and run for office (one woman won a seat in
2006).
The U.A.E. is a wealthy oil state and enjoys significant trade surpluses, largely due to its
successful economic diversification efforts. U.A.E. citizens enjoy the 5th highest per capita GDP
in the world ($49,700 est.) even though only about 30% of GDP is still based on oil and gas
output (CIA 2007). The government has worked hard to increase jobs for Emirati citizens,
encourage tourism, develop a modern infrastructure, and attract foreign investment (especially in
the high tech sector). The U.A.E. is well-known for its lavish spending on massive development
projects like the Palm, a beach community composed entirely of man-made islands.
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There are some problems facing the Emirates in the years ahead. The economy relies on
the back-breaking labor of imported foreign workers, many of whom live in deplorable
conditions with little pay and even less rights. Income distribution is uneven even among
citizens, with the majority of wealthy Emiratis clustered around Dubai and Abu Dhabi (Walters,
Kadragic and Walters 2006). Environmental degradation and water scarcity also pose a threat to
potential growth. Critics have argued that its educational system does not adequately prepare its
graduates for modern jobs. This is partially based on a lack of demand, as many citizens can
make a good living serving as the native silent partner for foreign businesses (required by U.A.E.
law) (Walters, Kadragic and Walters 2006). This has created a “debilitating anti-entrepreneurial
torpor” which is not easily overcome in a population accustomed to living well without working
hard (p. 5).
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Chapter 1: Advantages of the G.C.C. Governments
The term “constitutional monarchy” in today’s parlance is generally used to refer to a
“democracy decorated by a monarchy” such as in England. And yet, another definition of the
term from the historical literature would include monarchies with constitutions and elected
parliaments that have “not wholly usurped the monarch’s power to determine the composition of
the ministry” (Herb 2005, p. 171). This second definition is more relevant to the oil states of the
Persian Gulf. Despite their continued, seemingly anachronistic existence, little explicitly
comparative work has been done to study the process by which absolute monarchies become
constitutional monarchies, which in turn become fully parliamentary (Herb 2005). Part of the
problem, according to Herb, is that most political scientists studying past transitions tend to
“assume parliamentarism and identify democratization with the enfranchisement of the male
working class” (2005, p. 171). He claims that this approach has hobbled our understanding of
the Arab constitutional monarchies, where the process has been the opposite, with voting rights
often proceeding full control over the cabinet (2005). Among Middle Eastern scholars, there has
been some work recently that argues that monarchism can facilitate democratization in the Arab
context (Herb 2005). The theory behind this work is that monarchy has certain features and
characteristics which make it uniquely capable of handling the challenges and risks associated
with transitions to democracy.
One of the main arguments for optimism is the unique properties of monarchism itself. A
number of scholars have posited that monarchies are likely to be the most successful at adapting
and reforming without the risk of being overthrown. The corollary to this is that because they
face less risk in opening political space, they are more likely to do so. A major reason for the
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flexibility and strength of these monarchies is tied to ideology, or more specifically, the lack of
ideology. As Barry Rubin notes, the monarchs of the Gulf
never achieved a form of calcified modernization as Arab nationalist
dictatorships. The conservative monarchies proved to be more flexible than the
ideologically set, Soviet-style mobilization states unwilling to share power with
anyone (2006, p. 77).
Rather, because their regime and right to rule are not wedded to a specific ideology, they can
adopt selective reforms as they see fit, without challenging the basis of the system. Essentially,
they are free to adopt whatever policy they want, whereas Arab republics are often based on oneparty rule and nationalist populism.
This flexibility has contributed to regional stability, allowing Gulf regimes to ride out the
unrest and upheavals of the greater Middle East. As Shafeeq Ghabra points out,
this is due to respect for social pacts, social rules and family balances. There is an
ability to reconcile conflict internally between one faction of a family and
another, even in the ruling family itself. This has contributed to a “wisdom of
government” which has distinguished Gulf systems from many other Arab
revolutionary “republics” (Klein et al. 2000, p.12 ).
There is a certain irony to the fact that successful reforms of the Middle East have been
“remarkably rare and highly concentrated in the Persian Gulf monarchies; . . . [the most]
politically reactionary of Arab states . . . have now become the most progressive” (Rubin 2006,
p. 77). Indeed, many scholars believe that the G.C.C. states may be in a far better position than
other Arab regimes to contemplate the kinds of changes democratization would require (Kirby
2000). Specifically, “Arab monarchs have more institutional and symbolic room to improvise
reforms than do Arab presidents, who are invariably trapped by ruling parties and their
constituencies” (Brumberg 2002, p. 66). By not basing their rule on “the rhetoric of revolution
and ill-conceived economic policy” but rather agreed-upon traditions and cultural values, they
can contemplate reform without fear of “evisceration or abolition” (Kirby 2000, p. 10).
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Monarchies can, and often do, encourage pluralism (ta’addudiyya) whereas republics require
uniformity to maintain their power (Lucas 2004).
Another reason why monarchs are more willing to use political liberalization as a
survival strategy is that they are better able to control the outcome of increased participation.
Many have experimented with free elections for parliaments with limited authority. Also
importantly, opposition in the Gulf States is largely a loyal one; they do not call foroverthrowing
the current regime (Crystal 2005). Rather, because these monarchs enjoy substantial legitimacy
and for the most part rule quite benevolently, opposition forces have mostly been content to work
with the system and within proscribed limits. Therefore, a monarch contemplating such an
opening has less to fear from the opposition than a republican leader such as Egypt’s Hosni
Mubarak. Partial democratization in the G.C.C. is unlikely to lead to an Islamist takeover; in
fact, parliamentary life has promoted moderation among Islamists (Herb 2003). Rather, active
parliaments and free elections can lay the foundation for a freer and more democratic Gulf region
(Herb 2003).
One could make an argument that the reason these regimes are so willing to try limited
experiments with democracy is because they are confident that the end result will not be
democracy. Fair enough. But as Jill Crystal points out, what rulers intend and what actually
happens may be two different things.
Even if rulers are driven by a range of self-interested and non-democratic
impulses, their reforms make take on a life of their own and democratic
transitions may occur despite rulers’ best efforts to contain reform. Indeed, in
most cases historically, democracy happened by accident, despite the best efforts
of authoritarian rulers to control liberalization. Reforms raise expectations.
There is no reason to believe the current democratic opening may not develop an
unintended momentum in the Gulf as well with first appointed, then elected
officials pushing for more public debate. It is quite possible these openings can
have a continuing cascade effect on each other (2005, p.9).
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Gulf monarchs enjoy substantial loyalty and legitimacy among their people. For each of
the G.C.C. states, historical tradition is a tangible, important source of legitimacy—their
monarchies represent a connection to a rapidly-receding past. This is further reinforced by royal
benevolence in the spending of oil revenues (Kamrava 1998). This legitimacy among the
population (especially among powerful tribes) has been the key to the stability of the region’s
kings (Kamrava 1998). And yet, there is growing recognition by Gulf kings that they need to
secure legitimacy in a more popularly-based, democratic manner if they are to remain in power
(Kumaraswamy 2006).
There has been substantial progress toward greater participation and openness in the Gulf
monarchies. According to Owen H. Kirby, “Political change is now occurring in the
monarchies,” and in many ways the monarchs themselves are leading the way (2000, p. 11). As
Zakaria notes, “on virtually every political issue the monarchs are more liberal than the societies
over which they reign” (2004, p. 2). Part of this trend is due to the relative youth of some of the
monarchs—Qatar and Bahrain have made some of the most impressive reforms, and they are
also ruled by the two youngest monarchs, King Hamad and Emir Hamad, respectively. Both
rulers were educated abroad at Sandhurst Military Academy in England, and both have only been
in power since the 1990s (see table 1).
Table 1 G.C.C. Monarchs, Ages, Dates of Ascension, and Education
Ruler
Age Ascension
Bahrain King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
38
1999
Kuwait Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah
78
2006
Oman
Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said
67
1970
Qatar
Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani
55
1995
S.A.
King Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud
83
*2005
U.A.E. President Khalifa bin Zayid al-Nuhayyan
59
2004

Secondary Education
Sandhurst, England
Local education
Sandhurst, England
Sandhurst, England
Local education
Local education

*de facto ruler since 1995

In a speech in Doha at the 7th Forum for Democracy, Development, and Free Trade, in 2007,
Emir Hamad of Bahrain said
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I have to affirm that the region's march toward democracy, development and the
age of free trade, even if it is slow at times, will go on and be completed because
it is guided by man’s instinctive desire for freedom and his endeavor for progress
and advancement. The Arab citizen will not depart from the course taken by all
those who achieved freedom.3
For his part, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa of Qatar has said,
We have simply got to reform ourselves. We’re living in a modern age. People
log on to the Internet. They watch cable TV. You cannot isolate yourself in
today’s world. And our reforms are progressing well. In a tribal country like
Qatar, however, it could take time for everyone to accept what we’ve done. But
change, more change, is coming (Miles 2005, p. 75).
The combination of youthful, more liberal rulers and the regional trend towards reform has lead
some to argue that “it is not unreasonable to consider the hypothesis that recent developments
represent a break with the past and signal the emergence of new political tendencies in the Arab
world” (Tessler and Gao 2005, p. 93). Still, youth is not everything, and even old dogs can learn
new tricks. It was after all 78 year old Emir Sabah of Kuwait who granted women the vote by
royal decree. All the G.C.C. monarchs have shown an impressive capacity for adapting to new
circumstances. In fact, Kirby argues that it is still too early to write off the “Old Guard” in Saudi
Arabia and the U.A.E., where reform is proceeding more slowly due to local considerations—but
it is surely occurring (2000). In 2003, facing pressure at home and abroad, then Crown Prince
Abdallah invited a group of reform advocates, including Shias and women, to participate in a
“national dialogue.” Although their demands represented a challenge to the ruler’s absolute
power, Abdallah considered and replied to several of their concerns. Another effect of this
discussion was the decision to hold municipal elections (the country’s first-ever) in 2005
(Nakash 2006).
An important change that has occurred in recent decades is the extent to which
democracy is discussed and seen as a desirable goal. The younger generation of rulers in the
3

http://www.diwan.gov.qa/english/the_amir/the_amir_speeche_73.htm
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Gulf States has talked a great deal about how and when their countries might become
democratic. The emir of Qatar, for example, has said that his “hope is to see Qatar as a
democracy before I leave" (El-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002, p. 82). There seems to be
recognition, at least among some of these regimes, that a transition to a more democratic society
is inevitable, perhaps even desirable. The foreign minister of Qatar has said regarding reforms
that “either you open the door or they break the door” (El-Nawaway and Iskandar 2002, p. 117).
Many would argue that these regimes have merely adopted the language of reform to appease
international and domestic pressure. And yet, whether they are sincere or not, they have
established democracy as the model or goal for their countries. Indeed, across the Middle East,
the discourse of democracy has become widespread.
Thanks in part to the rise of new media such as Al-Jazeera, there is active debate within
Arab countries about democracy and pluralism. A new paradigm has emerged in which in order
for a ruler to be seen as legitimate internationally, he must at least pretend to favor democracy.
In many ways, the holding of elections in the Gulf States have been the result of this need by the
ruler for international approbation based on domestic support. And whether these kings truly
intend it or not, their citizens may begin to take them seriously. They may actually begin to
expect and even demand that the rulers live up to their rhetoric. This is a good sign; the more
people talk about democracy, the less foreign a concept it will become. Despite arguments that
this is merely cynical lip-service designed to appease foreign governments, a case can also be
made that even discussing democracy is granting it legitimacy. And if democracy is an ideal
form of government, then absolute monarchic rule is inherently flawed. Even if these regimes do
not mean the words they say, they may be forced to abide by them.
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Chapter 2: Advantages of G.C.C. Societies
Quite apart from the inherent political features of monarchies, the six G.C.C. states have
other unique properties related to their people and culture which may prove advantageous for
future transitions to parliamentary democracy. The many commonalities shared by the people of
the Gulf are part of the reason why it makes so much sense to treat them as a special subset of
the larger Middle East region. They enjoy unique demographic, financial and cultural traits that
I will argue, make them better suited to democratization than their Arab neighbors. In short,
democracy, if it truly takes root in the Gulf kingdoms, will do so in quite fertile soil.
One important way in which the G.C.C. states are different from other Arab states as well
as other Arab monarchies is population size. All six of these monarchies have small populations
and relatively high per-capita incomes. Saudi Arabia is certainly the largest, though its
population is remarkably small (20 million) given its vast territory. And though its per capita
income is lower than the others, its revenues are substantially larger as well. Overall then, these
monarchies have been blessed with vast resources and small populations. In fact, the six G.C.C.
states have the highest per-capita GDP in the entire Arab world (see table 2)—the U.A.E. is
ranked fifth in the world, ahead of even the United States. This is advantageous in a number of
ways.
Table 2 G.C.C. GDP per capita
U. A. E.
Qatar
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Saudi Arabia

GDP per capita
$49,700
$29,800
$25,800
$23,100
$14,400
$13,600

Source: CIA 2007
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First, this ratio of wealth to population generally tends to reduce the risks of reform and
make its ill effects more manageable (Policy Brief #8 2002). Second, as Larry Diamond has
noted, there is a striking correlation between population size and regime type, such that countries
with smaller populations are much more likely to be liberal and democratic (Diamond 2002).
This may be a function of the “small is pluralistic” effect, which enables the monarchies to
embrace pluralism rather than perceive it as a threat (Lucas 2004, p.111). It is partly because of
their intrinsic pluralism that monarchies, Nonneman argues, find it easier than other authoritarian
regimes to adopt adaptive strategies (such as selective liberalization) without risking overthrow
(2001). Also, due to their higher quality of life, these states attract a large number of foreigners,
who comprise nearly a third of the total Gulf population (see table 3). In Qatar this figure is
likely as much as 80% (Dresch 2006). This has been called “de facto multiculturalism” (Fox,
Mourtada-Sabbah, and al-Mutawa 2006, p. 3).
Table 3 G.C.C. Population Data for Citizens and Non-Citizens
Population
Non-citizens Percent (%) of Population Non- Citizen
U. A. E.
4,444,011
*2,738,000
62
Qatar
907,229
**725,783
80
Bahrain
708,573
235,000
33
Kuwait
2,505,559
1,291,354
52
Oman
3,204,897
577,293
18
Saudi Arabia
27,601,038
5,576,076
20
Source: CIA 2007
* Human Rights Watch 2007
** Estimated based on given percentage

Third, a large pie divided fewer ways means that the government can use its oil money to
subsidize a very comfortable lifestyle for its citizens, who are then less likely to be opposed to
the regime and its policies. By directly providing important services such as education,
healthcare, and social welfare the state creates a citizenry both dependent upon it and loyal to it
(Sarsar 2000). And these services are generally only available to citizens, thus excluding huge
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numbers of resident foreign workers, making the population functionally even smaller. All of
this is not to say that these countries must or necessarily will become democratic because of their
demographic and financial positions—rather, it represents a distinct advantage for the G.C.C.
when and if they do progress toward democracy.
Given the vast oil wealth and royal control over revenues, it is unsurprising that
corruption would be an issue for the Gulf States. Indeed, corruption is an extremely pervasive
phenomenon across the entire developing world, and the Middle East is no exception. What
might be somewhat surprising is that it is the rich oil kingdoms which represent the least corrupt
of all the Arab states.

Table 4 G.C.C. Corruption Perceptions Index Score and Regional Ranking (2003-2006)
Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI) Score and Regional
Ranking
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
Rank
Score
U. A. E.
5.2
5
6.1
2
6.2
2
6.2
Qatar
5.6
3
5.2
5
5.9
3
6
Bahrain
6.1
2
5.8
3
5.8
4
5.7
Kuwait
5.3
4
4.6
7
4.7
7
4.8
Oman
6.3
1
6.1
1
6.3
1
5.4
Saudi
Arabia
4.5
8
3.4
8
3.4
8
3.3

2006
Rank
1
2
3
6
4

Source: Transparency International 2003-2006

As table 4 shows, the six G.C.C. states are consistently ranked among the least corrupt in the
Arab world. Oman, in particular, stands out as the least corrupt Arab state for several years
running. Transparency International’s highly respected Corruption Perceptions Index ranks
countries from 1.0 to 10.0, with 10.0 being the least corrupt and 1.0 being the most. For a sense
of perspective, consider the U.S.’s score for 2006, 7.5, which ranks 18th in the world. The
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U.A.E. fares only slightly worse at 31st in the world, still well above average. The figures for
2005 show that as in 2006, the U.A.E., Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman held the top four spots
regionally. This means that these four countries are all perceived as being less corrupt than, for
example, Egypt or even South Korea. This seems to show that a country can be rich and ruled
by a monarch and still benefit from good governance and lower levels of corruption. While the
picture is less rosy for Kuwait and even more so for Saudi Arabia, they are still near the top of
the list regionally. Kuwait, at a respectable 6th among Arab states, trails only Jordan, and even
Saudi Arabia at 8th is still ahead of Morocco, Algeria, Syria and Yemen. The point to be taken
from these statistics is that over all, the six G.C.C. states are among the least corrupt in the Arab
world, despite having vast mineral wealth and monarchs with absolute power. If corruption is a
signal that a state is not functionally adequately, then the relatively low levels of corruption in
the G.C.C. suggest that a fairly capable state apparatus is doing a better than average job of
managing the country. This bodes well for the future prosperity and stability of these regimes.
Much ink has been spilled on the relationship between Islam and democracy.
Specifically, some scholars have argued that the two are fundamentally incompatible. In a series
of public opinion studies conducted in the Arab world in recent years, one of the central findings
has been the remarkably high degree of popular support for democracy (Tessler and Gao 2005).
This support is strong in both absolute terms and relative to other regions of the world. In fact,
large majorities in Arab countries, including supporters of political Islam, prefer democratic a
democratic system for their countries (Tessler and Gao 2005). In assessing the prospects for
democratization in Arab states, it is important to consider to what extent the public desires and
supports such change.
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And to the extent that Islam influences Arab opinions, the evidence is that it is often
supportive toward democracy. As Abdelwahab El-Affendi points out, “Muslim communities
have responded positively both to democracy and to most aspects of liberalism. Limits on state
authority, the separation of powers, and constitutionalism in general, have traditionally found
strong support in Muslim circles” (2003, p. 36). Diamond agrees, and notes that “the growing
body of public opinion survey evidence shows that Muslims desire democracy pretty much to the
same degree that people of other faiths do, particularly when we control for education and
income” (Diamond 2004, p. 1). Furthermore, Tessler’s surveys have shown little evidence for a
relationship between religious attachment and support for democracy (Diamond 2004).
Although the vast majority of Muslims possess favorable attitudes toward democracy,
this is not without reservations. Especially in the Gulf monarchies, people often take a long view
on potential reforms. Many believe that the best way to proceed is slowly and cautiously—the
chaos and instability of rapid political change concerns many citizens. Rather, the current
attitude in the Gulf States favors slow and incremental change to minimize this risk of chaos.
They believe that a slower process would provide an opportunity to “reduce resistance to
democratic ideals, eventually win over skeptics, and prevent a serious backlash that could stifle
future progress” (Ben-Meir 2006, p. 329). In many ways, this cautious approach may make the
reforms needed for democratization more palatable to rulers and ruled alike. In so far as popular
support helps in the transition to democracy, “the Arab world is ripe for change” (Tessler and
Gao 2005, p. 93).
In contrast to the idea that democracy is somehow fundamentally alien or foreign to Arab
Muslims, a more careful study of Islamic culture and history reveals traditions which are highly
democratic. In particular, the tradition of consultation, or shura, is frequently cited by Muslim
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liberals as proof of Islam’s democratic nature. The Koran explicitly recommends that the ruler
should consult with the people, lest his rule be characterized as istibdad, or despotism (Lewis
2005). Who it is he should consult varies, but it generally includes the powerful and influential
members of society, such as clergy, landowners, and members of the elite. While this is
certainly not the equivalent of one man, one vote, it does point to the fact that Islam and Islamic
tradition call for a government to be in some manner accountable to the people.
Bernard Lewis explains that the Islamic ideal of governance calls for a new leader to be
“chosen,” which does not exactly mean “elected.” “Rather, it refers to a small group of suitable,
competent people choosing the ruler’s successor. In principle, hereditary succession is rejected
by the juristic tradition” (Lewis 2005). Despite this, in the G.C.C. monarchies, succession is
nearly always determined to a great extent by heredity. But as Lewis points out,
the element of consent is still important. In theory, at times even in practice, the
ruler’s power—both gaining it and maintaining it—depends on the consent of the
ruled. The basis of the ruler’s authority is described in the classical texts by the
Arabic world bay’a, a term usually translated as ‘homage,’ . . . but a more
accurate translation would be ‘deal,’ in other words, a contract between the ruler
and the ruled in which both have obligations (2005, p. 42).
It is this interpretation of shura which allows many fundamentalists to accept the idea that Islam
is not opposed to democracy (Filali-Ansary 2003). The idea that Islam favors a consensual
relationship between rulers and ruled is not a new one, but it is being used in a new way to
promote better governance in the Islamic world.
In the Gulf States, the tradition of consultation is a fundamental part of the political
bargain between the regime and the people. In Kuwait, for example, the practice of diwaniyya—
a regular gathering of men who meet socially in each others’ homes to discuss public issues—is
tolerated if not encouraged by the regime (Nonneman 2001). It is this tradition of consultation
that is in evidence in each country’s Parliament, sometimes referred to as a Majils (advisory

42

council), or even in Saudi Arabia, as Shura. It has become an accepted principle in recent years
that while the king is largely free of legal or constitutional checks on his power, he must (at least
appear to) respect the opinion and will of the appointed and popularly-elected members of
Parliament.
The tradition of consultation has other advantages for Gulf societies as well. They
frequently provide an important forum for discussion and a mechanism for popular input into the
regime’s decision-making process.
Where these institutions are more than window dressing, such as in Kuwait, they
demonstrate that the regime is accessible to the people and reduce the sense of
political alienation created by the ruling family’s domination of politics. Even
where they are weak, they suggest that the ruling families are willing to go
outside their own ranks when weighing decisions (Byman and Green 1999, p. 78).
Over the last few decades, these parliaments have generally been expanded, and more members
are now elected than before. “The parliaments of the Arab monarchies are not mere facades”
(Herb 2003, p. 189). Still, it would incorrect to suggest that the advisory councils of the Gulf
States represent a major check on royal power. They are, however, growing in relevance and
influence, albeit slowly, and if the trend continues they are likely to become increasingly
powerful.
Another advantage for the Gulf States is that through formal and informal consultation
mechanisms and forums, they are able to put themselves in closer contact with the needs and
feelings of their citizens.
To varying degrees, all Gulf ruling families and elites offer access to their citizens
by holding regular, but informal meetings wherein citizens can air their
complaints, petition for redress of grievances, or otherwise try to influence local
and national politics. . . . By attending local gatherings and simply keeping their
doors open, ruling families generally have access to public opinion (Byman and
Green 1999, p. 79).
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This serves two important purposes. It allows the regime to anticipate public reaction to various
policies, and also helps them monitor and address levels of opposition and discontent before they
get out of hand.
The local gatherings, informal talks, and weak legislatures bolster regime claims
that they respect, and listen to, the voices of the citizenry. Indeed, the one-to-one
contact with the ruling families generates a sense of common identity between the
rulers and the ruled (Byman and Green 1999, p. 79).
Despite the autocratic nature of their regimes, Gulf monarchs primarily rule with strong popular
support and loyalty. It is imperative to their legitimacy and the political bargain they have
established that people feel connected to country and king. “Alienation, both moral and political,
is reduced by the Gulf leaders’ public identification with the zeitgeist” (Byman and Green 1999,
p. 77). Their relatively benevolent nature and willingness to keep channels open for their
citizens set them apart from the Arab republican regimes of the region.
In his comparative study of monarchies from the Middle East and Europe, Herb found
that monarchies which made a peaceful transition to parliamentarism were overwhelmingly
associated with free and fair elections. In other monarchies, which failed to make the transition
(many of whom saw their monarchs toppled), the political system was characterized by
substantial government manipulation of elections which undermined public confidence in the
legitimacy of the entire system (Herb 2005). What can this correlation tell us about the Persian
Gulf monarchies?
If democratic values and principles are to take root in the Gulf region, they will need to
be understood and embraced by the people. Luckily, Gulf citizens are increasingly experiencing
one of democracy’s most important features: relatively free and fair elections. And though
certain problems exist with regard to total enfranchisement, the Gulf monarchies can claim to
have some of the most transparent and legitimate elections in the Middle East.
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Elections in the G.C.C. are often marred by restrictions on campaigning and organization,
voter disenfranchisement, and problems of under-representation. However, “the absence of
direct government manipulation of elections in the Arab monarchies . . . offers a good deal of
encouragement, and there can be little hope for the eventual achievement of parliamentarism if
this tradition is not maintained” (Herb 2005, p. 187). Whereas elections in other Arab states are
often of questionable fairness (e.g. Egypt) or non-existent (e.g. Syria), Gulf elections, when they
occur, tend to be seen as open and at least procedurally fair (Herb 2005).
Some might argue that the reason why Gulf monarchs do not interfere in elections is
because they do not feel threatened by their own parliaments, no matter what its composition.
This may be true. But the inherent value in elections lies in more than simply filling seats in a
parliament. As Marsha Pripstein Posusney argues, holding elections
foregrounds the principle that citizens have a right to self-selected political
representation. Polls that are carefully controlled by governments can still
provide a forum for diverse segments of society to publicly debate their collective
future, as well as new opportunities for political mobilization. In addition, even
legislatures with limited power often become the focus of press attention, so an
opposition presence in parliament can provide a means for critics of the ruling
regimes to promote their arguments via the official media (2005, p. 92).
The end result of elections, even to a parliament of limited authority, is that they expand the
arena of public debate, accustom people to democratic principles, and set a precedent for the
legitimate basis of governance. All of which is not to say that elections create democracy.
Rather, than elections can help to improve the prospects for further democratization.
Although some would scoff at the toothlessness of Gulf parliaments, they are not merely
facades (Herb 2005). In fact there is quite a range, from Saudi Arabia’s entirely-appointed
Consultative Council to Kuwait’s entirely-elected Parliament. In many ways, Kuwait’s
parliament has been a model for the Gulf; it is the most contentious and active of all the G.C.C.
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councils, and it has finally given women the franchise and allowed them to run for office. It has
substantial power vis-à-vis the executive, exercising a strong negative constraint over the
government and its composition. “Since 1992, the Kuwaiti parliament has used its powers to
force ministers from office and to influence the choice of new ministers” (Herb 2005, 176). In
fact, the Kuwaiti parliament did just that in March of this year, when Health Minister Sheikh
Ahmad Abdullah al-Sabah, a member of the royal family, was forced to quit following
accusations of mismanagement and incompetence (BBC News 3/4/2007). The parliament has
also forced through election reform designed to curb the government’s ability to buy votes. As
Herb puts it, “although there is nothing inevitable about further progress toward parliamentarism
in Kuwait, it is perhaps here, among the Arab monarchies, where such progress would be least
surprising” (Herb 2005, p. 189).
Every developing country at some point finds itself grappling with how to adjust to the
unsettling changes associated with modernization. No other region, however, has experienced
the kind of transformation the Gulf monarchies have undergone. Not so long ago these states
were economic backwaters: the discovery of oil led to the development of a modern state. Today
the region enjoys some of the highest standards of living in the Middle East. Literacy rates have
skyrocketed in a short time, and a modern infrastructure of roads, airports, cell phones and
internet access has grown up seemingly overnight (Willoughby 2006). And despite undergoing
such massive change in a short amount of time, these regimes have been among the most stable
of all the Arab States.
The transformation from desert nomadic tribes to modern urbanites has certainly not been
without its strains. “The spread of new ideas, new forms of communication, urbanization,
literacy, and other sources of change disrupted the rhythms of daily life and social hierarchies”
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(Byman and Green 1999, pp. 22-3). All of the Gulf monarchies tread a cautious path on issues
of social change, trying not to offend the sensibilities of its more traditional citizens. Social
issues are often bitterly contested, and have provoked bitter opposition among the population.
When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced that he was in favor of allowing women to
drive, it was the clergy and traditionalists who forced him to abandon the idea. And yet, if there
is an identifiable trend among the region’s rulers and people, it is generally the opposite: a
cautious but pronounced embrace of all the opportunities the modern world has to offer. The
youngest generations of the Gulf are now much more globally aware and connected than their
parents and grandparents. “They are already well able to decipher political realities and are
sophisticated at spotting propaganda. Unlike their parents, they have an internationalist outlook
and a rights-based mentality” (Miles 2005, p. 386).
One major aspect of this modernization has been the proliferation of information sources,
a substantial opening to the world that has transformed many areas into cosmopolitan and
pluralistic urban centers. The spread of internet cafes and satellite television has made it nearly
impossible for regimes to censor as they once did. Indeed, most traditional forms of censorship
are being gradually abandoned. In their wake has sprung a new generation of Arab teenagers
who are technologically savvy and “they are fast learning to expect the same opportunities has
their Western friends, with whom they keep in touch via email and the Internet” (Miles 2005, p.
386). Most of the recent progress in the Middle East in the protection of certain fundamental
freedoms has occurred in areas which have see increased information flows; in many ways,
satellite television is a force for protecting human rights (Windsor, Gersham, and Kramer 2006).
Setting aside the particulars of modernization theory, which has its flaws and does not
transfer very well to rentier states, the changes occurring in the Gulf do suggest a trend toward
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the pluralism and openness that democracy requires. Indeed, the current generation of Arab
youth in the Gulf States is among the most modern and free in the Arab world. They will come
of age with an understanding of all the variety the world has to offer, socially, politically, and
economically. It will likely become increasingly difficult for the monarchs of the region to
postpone democratic reforms indefinitely. The burgeoning youth population will be demanding
better economic results, better governance, and better opportunities. They will be less likely to
see the welfare state as royal benevolence and more likely to see it as a fundamental right. The
regimes will have to work hard to satisfy the expectations of what will before long be an
overwhelming majority of their populations.
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Chapter 3: Domestic Pressure for Reform
In addition to the many positive aspects of Gulf monarchies which make them more
hospitable to democratic reforms, there are also certain negative conditions which will affect
their prospects for democracy. Gone are the days when G.C.C. monarchs could depend upon an
uneducated, uninterested, and isolated population for acquiescence to their absolute rule. The
rapid modernization of Gulf societies has meant that more than ever before, these regimes are
facing increasing pressure from their people to be more accountable and more democratic.
Rentier theory predicts that as long as the oil money keeps flowing, people will gladly sign over
their destiny to their king. And yet, over the last decade, despite rising oil prices, Gulf citizens
have become increasingly assertive and discontented with their governments. There is reason to
believe that if and when democratization begins to take place in earnest, it will be because the
Gulf people have convinced their kings that it is in their kings’ interest to open participation and
share the burden of governance. And the pressure these regimes will face is very likely to
increase in the coming years.
Sclerotic regimes that cannot generate jobs and hope at a faster rate than the
population is growing cannot persist indefinitely. And the market-oriented
reforms necessary to unleash economic growth are unlikely to occur without
democratic change, because unless governments have much greater political
legitimacy, they will not have the nerve, and the autonomy from the decades-long
accumulation of vested interests, to take bold and difficult steps. There is a
demographic time bomb ticking in the Middle East, and it is going to sweep away
a lot of Western-leaning regimes sooner or later unless real reform gets going
(Diamond 2004, p. 3).
If one of the advantages enjoyed by the Gulf States is their vast oil wealth and small
populations, then anything which threatens that balance is cause for concern. One possibility
would be a downward slide in oil prices, leaving these countries with a much smaller pie to share
among the same number of people. This seems far less likely than a situation in which oil prices
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remain roughly the same but the number of people increases. Indeed, as in most of the
developing world, the Gulf emirates have extremely high birth rates (see table 5). The higher the
birth rate, the less money, benefits, and jobs there will be to go around. Another danger,
especially acute in Saudi Arabia, is that those frustrated by the lack of jobs and low living
standards will be more receptive to radical Islamist groups and terrorism (Fox, Sabbah, and alMutawa 2006).
Table 5 G.C.C. Populations Growth, Birth, and Death Rates
Pop. Growth Rate
Birth Rate¹
U.A.E
3.997%
16.09
Kuwait
3.561%
21.95
Oman
3.234%
35.76
Qatar
2.386%
15.56
Saudi Arabia
2.060%
29.10
Bahrain
1.392%
17.53

Death Rate²
2.16
2.39
3.78
4.82
2.55
4.21

Source: CIA 2007 (est.)
¹ births/1,000 population
² deaths/1,000 population

Compare these numbers with the birth rates for other countries. In the U.S., a modern Western
nation, the birth rate is a mere .894%. But even in other developing countries, the birth rates are
lower than the G.C.C.. India, for example, is only 1.606%, whereas Egypt is only 1.721%.
Therefore, we can expect the population of these small kingdoms to grow at a faster rate than
even many developing countries. It is important to note that the G.C.C. countries have some of
the lowest death rates in the entire world—lower by far than even the Western industrialized
nations. The U.A.E. in particular, has the lowest death rate in the world. Canada, for example,
that bastion of low violence and universal healthcare, has a death rate of 7.86, and the icecovered country of Greenland has a rate of 7.93. It is sufficient for now to note that the
populations of the G.C.C. states will continue to rise fairly rapidly for the foreseeable future
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Across the world, there are certain demographic patterns associated with developing
societies, and others associated with developed ones. Generally speaking, modern Western
nations tend to have older populations, while developing third-world countries tend to have
younger populations. Each has its own problems: rich Western nations must support ever larger
numbers of retirees, straining their welfare systems. In developing countries, the problem is how
to provide enough jobs and opportunity for the large numbers of young (especially male)
citizens. The six G.C.C. states all have very young populations (see table 6) and high growth
rates, making it ever more difficult to accommodate the need for employment and security of
each new generation.
Table 6 G.C.C. Population Age Distribution
Age Distribution (%)
0-15 yrs.
15-64 yrs.
U.A.E.
20.6
78.5
Saudi Arabia
38.2
59.4
Qatar
23.1
72.9
Oman
42.7
54.6
Kuwait
26.7
70.5
Bahrain
26.9
69.5

over 65 yrs.
0.9
2.4
4.0
2.7
2.8
3.7

Source: CIA 2007

These societies are heavily weighted toward the younger age groups; in Saudi Arabia and Oman,
children 15 and under represent roughly 40% of the entire population. Indeed, “seventy percent
of the people in the Gulf are under the age of 25. Sixty percent are under the age of 21. About
50 percent are under the age of 15. That says a lot about the coming of a new generation” (Klein
et al. 2000, p. 11). All of these children (the men, specifically) will be expecting jobs when they
graduate. The small numbers of those over age 65 is also telling; consider that same number in
the U.S., which is 12.6 percent. Given the low death rates and fairly high life expectancy
(ranging from 73 to 77, compared with 78 for the U.S.), it is clear that it is not that these Gulf
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kingdoms have no older people. Rather, they represent a much smaller percentage of the total
population because there are so many young people. The median age of the population also
shows the preponderance of youth in these states. In the U.S., the median age is 36.6 years old.
But in the six G.C.C. countries, the number is lower (see table 7).
Table 7 G.C.C. Population Median Age

Oman
Kuwait
Bahrain
Qatar
UAE
Saudi Arabia

Total
18.9
26.0
29.7
31.9
30.1
21.4

Median Age
Male
21.5
27.9
32.7
37.3
32.0
22.9

Female
16.5
22.4
26.1
23.1
24.5
19.6

Source: CIA 2007

And as table 8 shows, the demographics are heavily weighted towards young men:
Table 8 G.C.C. Sex Ration by Age Distribution
Saudi Arabia
U.A.E.
Qatar
Oman
Kuwait
Bahrain

Sex Ratios (male/female)
at birth under 15
15-64
1.05
1.040
1.314
1.05
1.047
2.743
1.05
1.040
2.211
1.05
1.041
1.419
1.04
1.037
1.771
1.03
1.021
1.372

over 65
1.110
1.849
2.887
1.260
1.691
1.084

Total
1.196
2.190
1.852
1.238
1.526
1.255

Source: CIA 2007

Young men want good jobs and the ability to start and support a family. Unemployment,
therefore, is a substantial source of discontent. Whereas unemployment rates are quite low in
Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Qatar (2.2%, 2.4%, and 3.2 %, respectively), they are much higher in
Saudi Arabia (13%), Bahrain (15%), and Oman (15%) (CIA 2007).4 “High unemployment,
particularly among young university graduates, is considered one of the most dangerous socio-

4

Estimates are based on the following years: UAE (2001), Kuwait (2004), Qatar (2006), SA (2004), Bahrain (2005),
Oman (2004)
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political phenomena in any given regime, especially autocratic regimes” (Winckler 2002, p.
635).
In the 1990s in response to high unemployment and falling oil prices, the Gulf
governments were forced to adopt certain privatization measures (Winckler 2002, p. 635). The
high unemployment rates for citizens are not due entirely to an actual shortage of jobs; rather,
Gulf nationals prefer lucrative public sector jobs, and refuse to take lower-paid private sector
jobs (Klein et al. 2000). This has meant that the oil kingdoms have had to import cheap labor
from south-east Asia to do the jobs its own citizens would not. So long as oil revenues were high
and populations small, Gulf governments were able to provide jobs for most of their citizens.
This balance is threatened by the increasing size of Gulf populations. The government cannot
afford to give generous public sector jobs to all citizens indefinitely. Bahrain, for example, will
need to find jobs for 100,000 new workers in the next decade, which will be double its current
labor force (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and al-Mutawa 2006). Ultimately, some of the workforce
must be shifted to the private sector, which currently favors expatriate workers who are paid far
less than nationals. This withdrawal of government benefits would represent a fundamental
change in the political bargain of “no taxation, no representation” (Winckler 2002, p. 636).
Essentially, the current system of government subsidizing the wealth and lifestyles of nationals is
untenable. “The large youth populations of the Gulf expect high-paying, undemanding
government jobs while regimes have fewer resources with which to satisfy them” (Byman and
Green 1999, p. xiv). And it is unclear how the Gulf States will “provide schooling, medicine,
employment and growth in a society that is experiencing such a high rate of population growth”
(Klein et al. 2000, p. 11).
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What will Gulf governments need to do in the future to address this demographic reality?
Some have already begun the task of shifting nationals to the private sector. To accomplish this,
they have provided incentives for hiring nationals and attempted to increase the cost of foreign
labor (through visa fees, e.g.) (Klein et al. 2000). Abdelali Jbili argues that they should also
reduce the wage differential between public and private sectors, perhaps by extending public
sector benefits to private sector national workers. He also claims that the educational system in
the G.C.C. states must be reformed to better train and prepare college graduates for the realities
of the private sector economy. Finally, he suggests reducing government hiring while increasing
unemployment benefits (presumably to help cushion the transition for those affected workers)
(Klein et al. 2000).
In the coming decades, Gulf governments will be faced with increasing demands for
services and employment that they cannot meet. The rise in oil prices in recent years has bought
the regimes some time to work out a long-term solution. Reform, on the order of increased
privatization, greater openness to foreign investment, and better regulation of the labor market,
will become necessary (Klein et al. 2000). As the government withdraws from its dominance of
the economy, it will create greater space for entrepreneurship and innovation. This economic
opening will expose Gulf residents to global forces and influences, force them to compete in the
world market, and ultimately result in more private initiative and new sources of wealth for the
population. The result of all this may well be the thriving, independent middle-class which has
historically been the basis for vibrant civic life and a force for democracy (Karatnycky 2002).
All of this will not be without some discomfort. Citizens of the G.C.C. states are
accustomed to a high standard of living with minimal effort or achievement. As Fox, MourtadaSabbah, and al-Mutawa put it,
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“Gulf nationals have variously developed quite luxurious lifestyles while producing few
goods exportable to other regions of the world except for petroleum products” (2006, p. 40).
Government largesse and domination of the economy has produced a system that reinforces
idleness and suppresses initiative (Karatnycky 2002). A good gauge of the high quality of life
enjoyed by Gulf citizens is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human
Development Index (HDI). The six G.C.C. states have the nearly the highest scores in the Arab
world (see table 9).
Table 9 Arab States Human Development Index Scores and Rankings (2004)
UNDP Human Development Index, 2004*
World Rank
Regional Rank
HDI Value
Kuwait
33
1
0.871
Bahrain
39
2
0.859
Qatar
46
3
0.844
U.A.E.
49
4
0.839
Oman
56
5
0.810
Libya
64
6
0.798
Saudi Arabia
76
7
0.777
Lebanon
78
8
0.774
Jordan
86
9
0.760
Tunisia
87
10
0.760
Iran
96
11
0.746
Pal. Territory
100
12
0.736
Algeria
102
13
0.728
Syria
107
14
0.716
Egypt
111
15
0.702
Morocco
123
16
0.640
Yemen
150
17
0.492

HDI Level
High
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low

Source: UNDP 2006 (Iraq excluded due to having no HDI value)
*2006 Report contains Human Development Index (HDI) values for 2004

Thanks in large part to state-funded social services, such as education and healthcare, Gulf
residents live higher quality lives than most of their Arab brethren. And they have done so
without having to exert much effort. The challenge to Gulf regimes is to transition their
population from dependency to productivity while maintaining political stability. It’s a tall
order. While asking for sacrifices and adjustments from their citizens, these regimes may be
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forced to offer something in return. And such concessions may well include greater participation
in governance and better protection of individual rights.
For those who subscribe to modernization theory, rising education levels are a necessary
part of a broader social process which leads to democracy. Education is certainly important: an
articulate and informed public is better able to organize and communicate with each other and
the regime, and thus better equipped to promote democratic reforms. Education is also the key to
job growth and economic success. And yet, although literacy rates have risen across the Arab
world, schools are not necessarily preparing students to succeed in the new global economy
(Haass 2003). In many Arab countries, schooling is predominantly rote memorization and
reinforces certain prejudices and biases against women and minorities (Rubin 2006).
If education is to play its part in bringing about a better informed and more politically
active populace, and if Arab citizens are to prosper in this new century, then the educational
system itself must be reformed. Some of Gulf States have made tremendous progress in
improving the quality of learning available to their people. Qatar has gone perhaps the farthest
in modernizing education; the emir and his wife have made it a national priority and spent
billions on the project. They have worked to bring to Qatar local branches of American
universities, including Cornell University, Virginia University, Carnegie Mellon, Texas A&M
(among others), as well as a joint Rand Corporation-Qatari think tank (Miles 2005). Many of
these branches are located in Qatar’s “Education City,” a 2,500 acre development which
integrates all levels of education and first-rate resources for researchers, creating a kind of hub
for new knowledge. Tuition at these elite American schools is paid for by the Qatari
government, and having these local branches helps students avoid the need to study abroad to
receive a high-quality education.
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Because it is difficult for Qatari women to study abroad on their own, the presence of
American schools and the improvements in the local universities have made it possible for
women to enjoy the same access to first-rate education that males receive. It is in part due to this
benefit that women make up the majority of university students in Qatar, although they also
outnumber males in Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as well (see table 10) (Pollock 2007).
“Literacy gaps between men and women in the Gulf States are moderate or even non-existent—a
condition that might provide a substantial advantage for possible future democratization” (Fish
2002, p. 34).
Table 10 Arab States Female University Enrollment (%) (2005)
Female University Enrollment, 2005
70 %
Kuwait
68 %
Qatar
68 %
Bahrain
58 %
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
57 %
Algeria
57 %
Lebanon
53 %
51 %
Oman
Jordan
50 %
Palestinian Territories
50 %
Morocco
45 %
Iraq
36 %
Yemen
26 %
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

Progress is being made in the other G.C.C. States as well. Bahrain has created a new
polytechnic school and is working to improve the level of vocational training to prepare workers
for the private sector. Oman has sought to position itself as the destination of choice for
information technology study, and has launched a new IT school and IT research and business
center. Kuwait has partnered with UNESCO to revamp its secondary school system. It seems
that most of these governments appreciate the need to improve their education systems so that
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they meet the needs of their modernizing population. If they are able to do so, the result will be a
better informed and educated populace able to compete in the world and potentially be a force
for change in their countries.
There are dangers ahead for regimes that fail to solve the education problem. When
students must leave their country to get a quality education, they are exposed to a wide variety of
new influences. And while sending students abroad may be a short cut for a country with
inadequate educational opportunities, there is perhaps another substantial danger. Students who
return from abroad “often bring back destabilizing political ideas—expectations for liberalism,
egalitarianism, or government transparency—that can threaten regime legitimacy” (Byman and
Green 1999, pp. 18-19). Once exposed to a wider, freer world, many students may expect the
same back at home—an expectation that Gulf regimes will have to confront.
The rentier thesis predicts that citizens of oil monarchies will be politically disengaged
and complacent so long as the government continues to subsidize their high standard of living.
The Gulf States, however, are not without opposition and discontent. Even people who are
generally supportive of their government have an interest in good governance and policy. It is
hard to imagine why a Gulf citizen should care any less about the quality of his or her
government than a citizen of any other country. To be fair, the levels of anger and frustration in
the oil states have most likely been somewhat muted by the benefits of oil wealth. But it would
be a mistake to assume that the people of the Persian Gulf do not have grievances and concerns.
There is reason to believe that addressing the discontent in their countries may prove to be a
major challenge for the G.C.C..
What are the sources of discontent in the petro-monarchies? Some are demographic, and
include issues such as unemployment and the large numbers of foreign workers. Others are
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economic, and are concerned with economic growth and opportunity. Social issues continue to
be a source of discontent, with some impatient at the slow pace of change, and others outraged at
the dramatic changes that have transpired. Finally, a growing number of complaints relate to
political rights and governance. Across the board, people are pressing their governments to be
more transparent and inclusive. In spite of the predictions of rentier theory, there is substantial
dissatisfaction among Gulf citizens on a variety of topics. For example, the 2003 Kuwaiti
elections and the establishment of nominated legislative bodies in Saudi Arabia were both the
direct result of pressures from below (Kumaraswamy 2006). While this pressure may not result
in the types of violence that would lead to a regime being overthrown, discontent may pose a
growing threat to the stability and continued prosperity of the G.C.C. states unless the rulers can
find a way to address their citizens’ concerns.
The demographic issue in particular is likely to be a troublesome one for the region.
Even if oil prices remain high, the burgeoning youth population will strain the resources of even
the richest states. The youth are dependent on the government for jobs, education, healthcare,
and prosperity. A government which fails to meet these expectations will face substantial
resentment. The younger generation no longer sees such benefits as gifts from the regime, but as
“virtual birthrights” (Byman and Green 1999, p. 14). The discontent arising from a reduction in
their standard of living would be even worse if they simultaneously saw royals continuing to live
lives of opulence and privilege, which they are extremely likely to do (Byman and Green 1999,
p. 15). Gulf citizens have tolerated the lavish lifestyles of their rulers as long as they were
satisfied with their own living standards. If the people’s situation is to decline (as it likely must),
then they may prove profoundly less tolerant of the prerogatives of their monarchs. Saudi
Arabian royals, in particular, are notorious for their conspicuous consumption. Most of Saudi
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Arabia’s perhaps 20,000 royals receive a stipend ranging from thousands to millions of dollars
each month. Royal family members are also increasingly dominant in lucrative government
contracts and businesses—a situation that has not gone unnoticed by less well-connected and
wealthy businessmen in the kingdom (Byman and Green 1999, p. 16).
Another issue which has been a source of discontent is the exclusion of Shia groups in
several countries. Shia unrest has been the most violent in Bahrain, where despite being a
majority of the population (70%), they have been excluded from power and underrepresented
politically. In response to intense pressure, including a domestic “uprising” that lasted through
most of the 1990s, Bahrain has undertaken a series of reforms. When the new king ascended in
1999, he granted amnesty to political prisoners, abolished state security courts, and allowed
greater freedom of assembly—all of which culminated in a new National Charter approved by
98% of Bahraini voters in 2001 (Byman and Green 1999). In short, the King Hamad bin Isa alKhalifa, a younger and more progressive ruler than his father, has attempted to address the
country’s economic and social unrest by increasing political participation. While the reforms
have not been without problems (such as some Shia groups boycotting elections), this strategy
seems to be a fairly successful one. It has a number of implications: a) when faced with
mounting discontent, the government has responded positively by granting greater rights and
freedoms, b) it demonstrates an unmistakable trend toward greater democracy, and c) such a
strategy may be successful in other countries. That the king considers such a response a good
option in the face of opposition bodes well for future reforms.
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Chapter 4: Economic Pressures for Reform
The demographic challenges that the G.C.C. monarchies will face in the coming years
make it essential that economic growth and health be maximized. In general, oil-based
economies suffer from a lack of privatization, diversification, foreign investment, and economic
openness; this is true of the Gulf monarchies to greater and lesser degrees. All of these problems
must be addressed if Gulf economies are to be capable of sustaining their rapidly increasing
populations. Fortunately, some progress has already been made. And while market economies
are most closely associated with democracy as a regime type, the relationship is not entirely
determinative. Rather, certain types of economic features are more conducive to the
opportunities and challenges presented by democratization. “To the extent that economic
variables make certain kinds of regime outcomes more likely, the prospects for the Gulf are
relatively positive” (Crystal 2005, p. 6).
There are some who would argue that because oil prices seem likely to remain high for
the foreseeable future, there is little motivation for the Gulf regimes to reform economically.
Thomas Friedman has said, “Give me $10-a-barrel oil, and I will give you political and
economic reform from Moscow to Riyadh to Iran” (Friedman 2006, World is Flat, p. 564). And
in the past, it is true, lower oil prices (as in the 1990s) did seem to pressure these regimes to
pursue at least economic, if not political reforms (Winckler 2002). But there is some reason to
believe that the Gulf monarchs have learned their lesson and despite the current glut of
petroleum wealth, they have begun planning for a future without oil (Ford 2006). The
inescapable truth for all six of the G.C.C. monarchies is that their oil supplies will not last
forever. Some, like Bahrain, have essentially already run out (only an estimated 35,000 barrel
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per day). What’s more, future revenues are unlikely to be able to rise fast enough to keep up
with the mounting socio-economic pressures.
Fortunately, the monarchs of the Gulf States are aware of this eventuality and seem to be
making attempts to develop strategies to increase investment and growth. In order to succeed,
these plans must include strengthening their private sectors so that so that they can provide jobs
for the burgeoning population and tax revenues to the central governments. And tax revenues, as
opposed to oil revenues, will likely require greater government accountability, a good omen for
further reform.
When a country bases its economy on a single source of revenue, such as oil, it generally
fails to develop any other effective and productive sectors. Sometimes referred to as Dutch Elm
Disease, such a condition makes any economic system structurally weak and vulnerable to
market fluctuations (Russell 2003). In the Gulf kingdoms, a lack of a diversified economy has
also meant that most jobs were either provided by the state or directly engaged in processing and
exporting the oil. But oil-related jobs are generally taken by foreigners—either because they are
too menial for locals or because they are too sophisticated and require foreign management. An
unbalanced economy cannot provide the same benefits a fully diversified one can—benefits that
will become increasingly necessary in the Gulf region.
In order to diversify, countries must be willing to invest in building up new industries
(including infrastructure and worker training). Without such a base for development, the longterm forecast for these regimes is not promising. Mustapha Nabli, the World Bank’s chief
economist for the Middle East and North Africa, has argued that part of the problem is that
current high overall levels of economic growth have masked the instability of the system. This
means that their growth is essentially false, “‘Because you have an increase in public
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expenditures which is multiplying and creating jobs but this cannot sustain itself as such’” (Ford
2006, p. 48).
Some progress is already being made. U.A.E. seems to be leading the way “among the
sister Gulf polities in economic diversifying beyond petroleum extraction” (Fox, MourtadaSabbah, and al-Mutawa 2006, p. 7). The Emirates have successfully marketed themselves
(particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai) as a modern, cosmopolitan business center connected to the
global network. In Dubai, for example, “the focus has been on the Internet and media cities,
large real estate and tourism development schemes, shopping festivals, Emirates Airline, and the
industrial and transshipment facilities in Jebel Ali and Port Rashid.” As Kirby puts it, “the
emirates are leading the Gulf Arabs in the race to build a viable economic basis for the day when
the bottom falls out of the oil industry” (2000, p. 8). One effect of seeking to establish
themselves as a center for business and tourism has been to create a de facto pluralism as people
from across the world flock to the Emirates for work and play. Other countries are beginning to
follow their lead. Dismantling the rentier state will take time, but it should be encouraging to
those hoping for political reform that the process has begun.
As previously noted, the private sectors in oil economies are very weak. This is proving
to be an increasingly important problem as Gulf regimes struggle to accommodate the needs of
their citizens for good jobs. Their reliance on foreign-workers is not a strategy for future
success. As Jbili puts it, “These countries need a healthy does of privatization” (Klein et al.
2000, p. 6). Government ownership is as little as 45% in the U.A.E., but up to 70% in Kuwait.
Progress is being made, but Jbili argues that they must also broaden the scope of this reform and
accelerate privatization initiatives (Klein et al. 2000). The Prime Minister of Kuwait has even
said that the country must stop hiring citizens in the public sector because it is a drain on
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resources. Further, most of those who work in the civil service are unnecessary (Fox, MourtadaSabbah, al-Mutawa 2006).
The emir of Qatar has been proactive in his efforts to bring Qatar’s economy into the
modern era. He is said to govern less like a monarch and more like a CEO. He has already
turned a number of public institutions, such as the postal service, over to the private sector (Miles
2005). Other G.C.C. states are making tremendous strides as well. The implications of greater
private sector productivity and economic involvement for the region are encouraging.
Privatization enables greater entrepreneurial activity and individual wealth creation—and is
necessary for the development of an independent middle class. And as Zakaria points out, “a
genuinely entrepreneurial business class would be the single most important force for change in
the Middle East, pulling along all others in its wake” (2004, p. 17). Such a group would have
interests independent of the state and would be able to force the regimes to be more transparent
and inclusive. The economic success of a country’s private sector requires that the state establish
genuine rule of law, openness to the world and access to information (Zakaria 2004, p. 16).
Historically, these forces have been a part of successful transitions to democratic rule.
In addition to diversifying their economies and promoting their private sectors, the Gulf
monarchies will need to increase foreign investment if they are to meet the challenges of the
future. In many ways, they are far better positioned for this than other Arab regimes, because
amid the chaos and violence of the Middle East they are virtual islands of calm and tranquility.
The successes of Dubai and the other emirates has inspired “current attempts elsewhere in other
Gulf Arab states to attract foreign investment by liberalizing investment regimes and establishing
free trade zones with sophisticated communications and transportation facilities” (Kirby 2000, p.
8). If increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) requires anything, it is above all openness and
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fairness. Investors should feel confident that their interests will be protected and that their
business can function effectively. For a long time, investment in the Gulf region was made
difficult by onerous laws requiring that a citizen of the kingdom be at least part-owner
(especially in Saudi Arabia). Now, efforts are being made to lift this requirement and streamline
the process for investing and buying into the local market. In short, the same improvements that
would increase FDI in the Gulf monarchies would also improve the overall quality of governance
and strengthen the rule of law.
A further advantage is that the more standardized the Gulf economies the more easily
they will be able to integrate into the global economic system. With an eye to improving their
situation vis-à-vis the industrialized world, all of the six Gulf monarchies have become members
of the World Trade Organization. And as Haass puts it, “Membership in the World Trade
Organization promotes both economic and political liberalization” (2003, p. 147). It certainly
requires that signatories work to create greater transparency, stability, predictability and
application of the rule of law in trade matters. In addition, Bahrain has a bilateral free-trade
agreement with the U.S., and Oman has signed one as well. All of these efforts mean that Gulf
economies are increasingly open to and involved in the larger global market. This bodes well for
their economic development as well as the future of their political reform efforts.
Weiffen argues that “if economic restructuring and/or political opening are initiated,
modernization and related social change will surely increase political mobilization and arouse
demands for political participation in the long run” (2004, p. 364). The more room the state
makes for private business and investment, and the more it improves its standard of governance,
the more political room will exist for newly empowered actors (such as entrepreneurs, the middle
class, etc.). Haass explains it well:
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Market-based economic modernization helps usher in elements of democracy—
the rule of law, transparent decision-making, the free exchange of ideas—which
in turn sustain and accelerate growth, though this path need not be sequential.
When political and economic freedom work hand in hand, democratization allows
the young to voice their aspirations while reinforced economic growth gives them
hope for a future of greater opportunity and prosperity (2003, p. 146).
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Chapter 5: External Pressure for Reform
The Gulf monarchies do not exist in a vacuum. They are exposed to substantial pressures
by international enemies and allies who would prefer that they at least appear more democratic,
if not indeed become so. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim notes, the Gulf monarchies are currently
leading the newest cycle of liberalization, whereas the Arab republics are falling behind (Ibrahim
2005). This is due at least in part to growing domestic and external pressures. It is in fact the
convergence of domestic discontent and Western pressure that has tipped the balance against the
more conservative forces, giving the impetus to the indigenous supporters of reform.
In the case of the Gulf States, Ibrahim argues that September 11th marked a turning point
in U.S. policy toward the region. What emerged was a consensus among the Western powers
(especially the U.S.) on the need for socio-political reform. Democracy, it was suggested, is the
antidote to the frustrations that breed terrorism. In Saudi Arabia, where 15 of the 9/11 hijackers
were from, U.S. pressure led the al Saud to reduce their support for reactionary, anti-Western
religious groups and call for greater tolerance and acceptance (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and alMutawa 2006). The result of the increased U.S. emphasis on human rights and liberalization is
that “talk about political reform and democracy is rife even in the Gulf monarchies where such
issues had been taboo” (Ottaway and Carothers 2004, p. 23). So long as the U.S. continues to
pressure the G.C.C. rulers to move their countries closer to a true constitutional monarchy, these
kings will feel obligated to undertake at least some reforms in order to satisfy its ally.
The main idea behind the “bad neighborhood” thesis is that what happens in one country
affects other countries nearby. Accepting this premise, however, does not require one to adopt a
fatalistic attitude toward the potential for democracy in the Gulf region. Rather, there is reason
to believe that successful reform in one G.C.C. monarchy may resonate in another, and that as
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Zakaria puts it, “success is infectious” (2004, p. 18). There is good reason to expect that
advances and innovations in one state may lead to greater calls for reform in its neighbors,
leading to a kind of reform cross-pollination. Each country’s experiments with democratic
institutions and laws can serve as model and inspiration for reformers across the region.
While the idea of cross-pollination and neighborhood influence is likely valid across a
variety of regions, it is especially pronounced in the Gulf States. In addition to the pressure
coming from the U.S. and other Western governments, the Gulf monarchies also face pressure
for reform from their neighbors.
The Gulf States have significant influence on each other. This is, after all, one
cultural lake with many tribes and families stretching across borders and with
many G.C.C. nationals (more than the governments would like to acknowledge)
discreetly possessing multiple G.C.C. passports (Crystal 2005, p. 5).
In addition to this cultural cross-pollination, the political systems of the six Gulf
kingdoms are remarkably similar, owing in large part to their influence on each other.
As Michael Herb has argued, the particular form of monarchical power in the
Gulf organized around sovereign ministries, that is, the distribution of specific
powerful ministries guaranteed to members of the ruling family, initially
pioneered in Kuwait and quickly adopted by all its monarchical neighbors.
Kuwait also pioneered the use of elected bodies on a significant scale and these
too were copied throughout the Gulf. Kuwait’s long history of reform has
certainly made it easier for reformers in other states to move forward. The
extension of suffrage to women was perhaps partly an element of that
competition. Qatar was unwilling to expand contestation but it could outdo
Kuwait in expanding representation. The extension of suffrage in Qatar, Bahrain
and Oman was a factor putting pressure on the Kuwaiti leadership to do the same.
Qatar might not allow as much debate over its own policies as some other states,
but it could, through al-Jazeera, give the appearance of allowing substantial
debate, opening the way for al-Arabiyya and other stations in the region. Reforms
in each state raise the bar for others (Crystal 2005, p. 5). (Italics added)
As each state tries some new reform or policy, the effects are widely observed. And
when some change goes well, it is more likely to be tried elsewhere. It is no accident that the
Gulf kingdoms have evolved similar political features. A look at when each country established
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its constitutions and legislative bodies gives a sense of the connectivity of the six states (see
tables 11-14). Equal voting rights for women show a similar trajectory, spreading from country
to country over a rather short period of time. And while Saudi Arabia may be a tougher case, it
is likely that the trends in the other five states will result in increased pressure on the al Saud to
improve their dismal record on women’s rights and expand recent experiments with limited
municipal elections.
Table 11 G.C.C. Date Women Given Right to Vote
Date Women Given Right to Vote
Qatar
1999
Bahrain
2002
Oman
2003
Kuwait
2005
U.A.E.
*2006
Saudi Arabia
not yet
Source: CIA 2007
* In 2006, men and women voted in a limited
election. No law yet.

Table 12 G.C.C. Date Constitution in Effect
Constitution in Effect
Kuwait
in effect since 1962
U.A.E.
interim 1971-96; permanent in effect since 1996
Bahrain
(1973-5); in effect since 2002
Qatar
in effect since 2005
Saudi Arabia
Basic Law since 1992 (royal decree)
Oman
Basic Law since 1996 (royal decree)
Table 13 G.C.C. Date Legislature Established
Date Legislature Established
Kuwait
1963
U.A.E.
1971
Bahrain
(1972-5); 1992, expanded 2002
Qatar
1972; planned expansion fall 2007
Oman
1981, expanded 1991, 1997
Saudi Arabia
1996, expanded 1997, 2001
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Table 14 G.C.C. Type of Legislature and Composition of Members
Type of Legislature
Elected Appointed
Kuwait
Unicameral
50
15
U.A.E.
Unicameral
20
20
Bahrain
Bicameral
40
40
Qatar
Unicameral
30
15
Oman
Bicameral
82
48
Saudi Arabia
Unicameral
0
120
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Conclusion: Prospects for Democratization
Rentier theory would suggest that there is little hope for democratization in the
G.C.C. States. So long as these states can depend upon vast oil riches, they will face no
overwhelming pressure to reform or democratize. What rentier theory neglects, however,
is the importance of human agency. Monarchs are motivated by more than money: they
also crave international legitimacy and respect. These values cannot be purchased; they
must be earned. Further, a desire to leave a legacy of reform, stability, and prosperity
might lead a ruler to contemplate changes not foreseen by rentier theory. Thus, while
rentierism is a valid theoretical concept, and does in many ways account for the poor
democratization record of the Middle East oil states, it is not purely deterministic.
Rather, it will vary from country to country. Some leaders will be content to use their
wealth to postpone democratic reforms which would challenge their power. Others may
be interested in leading the way to a more just and democratic society, using their oil
wealth to ease the transition. Therefore, while oil wealth may inhibit some normal
pathways to democracy, it does not preclude the possibility of democratic transition.
The problem with most of the available theories of democratization is that they
are based on the experiences of specific regions at specific times. Thus, they are not
entirely applicable to the oil monarchies. One can accept some of their premises and
concepts without fully embracing their predictions. Modernization theory, for example,
is based on sound principles. People who are wealthier and better educated tend to be
more democratic. And the pressures for change occurring in the Gulf States come in
large part from a new generation of youth who are aware of the world and have embraced
its interconnectedness. But where modernization offers a clear trajectory based on
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increasing wealth and industrial production, it is of limited usefulness in an area that does
not fit neatly into its paradigm. Therefore, modernization is of use in understanding
overall trends toward “modernity” in the G.C.C., but does not necessarily offer any
predictive insight.
The role of Islam in these and other Middle Eastern societies is profoundly
important and in many ways unique. Islam has cultural, political and religious
implications that make it more than a personal faith. This is not to defend the old canard
that Islam is incompatible with democracy: it is not. Rather, to acknowledge that religion
in the Arab Muslim world is not necessarily the equivalent of religion in other areas of
the world. This means that analyses of the region must have as their basis an
appreciation of the uniqueness of these societies. Any attempt to apply Western-based
theories of democratization to the Middle East must account for the unique role of Islam
in these countries. And yet, very few do.
It is easy to be cynical when talking about democratization in the Middle East. The
region has become a graveyard for the hopes of countless democracy promoters and activists.
And in many states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, this will likely be the case for quite some
time. And yet, it is in perhaps the most unlikely places that the seeds of future democratization
may exist. In a world of republics, the number of monarchies has dwindled substantially, the
majority concentrated in the Middle East. For too long policy-makers and scholars alike have
ignored or marginalized the rentier monarchies of the G.C.C.. They are substantially different
than other Arab countries, and even than other Arab monarchies (like Jordan and Morocco) due
to their oil wealth and close common ancestry and culture. For a long time, the rest of the Arab
world had looked down on the G.C.C. states for being overly traditional, backward—certainly
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not cosmopolitan or sophisticated like Cairo or Beirut. But in recent decades, something has
fundamentally shifted in the Gulf States and within the Arab region. Suddenly these
conservative, traditional regimes have become dynamic, progressive and focused on the future.
And the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf are doing all of this on their own terms.
To be fair, the states of the G.C.C. are not created equal. In many ways, Kuwait far
outstrips the others when it comes to parliamentary strength, freedom and political rights.
Bringing up the rear are Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., whose experiments with reform have been
extremely limited. On the score of economic reform, however, the U.A.E. leads the pack—
blazing a trail toward global economic integration and influence that is a model for other Gulf
States. In short, each state is finding its own way at its own pace. But make no mistake, change
is occurring—albeit slowly and sometimes imperceptibly. As Kirby notes,
In all the monarchic states, a debate on difficult issues is occurring; movement,
however incremental, is taking place. This is proof of the capacity of the
monarchic system to change and an indication of the monarchies’ confidence and
their ability to see how their own interests are interwoven with those of the state.
The debate is occurring to some degree in every Middle Eastern monarchy . . .
(2000, p. 10).

And as Tessler and Gao put it, “it is possible to have a meaningful discussion about whether the
glass is half full or half empty in some of these countries” (2005, p. 84).
As the kings of the petro-monarchies confront the new century, they face a time of
increasing change and modernization. There are mounting pressures on a number of fronts
which will make further maintenance of the status quo impossible. Each monarchy faces a stark
demographic fact: Gulf population growth rates are overwhelming economic growth rates. The
entire rentier system depends upon the state providing jobs and good lives for its citizens. And
yet, due to high birth rates and the increasing expectations of the youth, these states are in a
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fundamentally untenable position. Something has got to give. The stability of their rule has
rested in large part on public complacency and traditional sources of legitimacy. But as the
bargain between ruler and ruled breaks down, a new modus vivendi must be found. This pressure
will most likely lead the regime to offer more political participation and freedom in exchange its
continued rule.
In addition to the rising pressures of their people’s expectations, the Gulf monarchs also
bear in mind that the only way forward for them economically is to develop a sustainable system.
This means they must work towards greater diversification, privatization, and make their
economies attractive to investors. In short, they must join the global rules-based economy and
conform to international standards. This means giving greater power and freedom to native
entrepreneurs, loosening tax and investment regulations, streamlining business procedures, and
encouraging individual effort and wealth creation. In many ways, these reforms are easier and
less threatening than the needed political reforms, and regimes are likely to pursue these first.
The likely effect, intended or not, will be the creation some sort of independent business class.
The more people who have interests separate from the state, the greater the accountability they
will demand. In the end, the reforms that produce better economic results also favor greater
political openness and participation. “The places that offer the best prospects for democracy are
those where there is a process of gradual change in the direction of freer institutions. Democracy
usually evolves out of a movement toward freedom” (Lewis 2003, p. 219).
The countries of the G.C.C. will face more than just domestic pressure in the coming
years. The United States and the West are increasingly pushing for at least the appearance of
greater democracy. And while this may not produce substantive reforms, it does at least prevent
some of the more egregious forms of repression and control. More important, perhaps, than even
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U.S. influence is that of the neighborhood. Gulf States and peoples are remarkably
interconnected, and each is aware of what is occurring elsewhere. Reform in one country
(especially if it succeeds) creates pressure for reform in all the others. This means that even the
more recalcitrant regimes cannot postpone reform indefinitely.
The good news for the Gulf monarchies is that unlike their Arab neighbors, they have a
number of advantages that make democratic reform less destabilizing and more likely to succeed.
Whereas in some Arab republics, rulers face substantial resistance at every turn by radical
Islamists—Gulf Islamists are generally more moderate and content to work within the system
and with the monarch. Rather than being the only opposition, they are only one group among
many. Therefore, a monarch essentially can implement top-down reforms as needed without too
great concern. Monarchs can adopt virtually any position without worrying about betraying a
founding ideology, and can co-opt opposition platforms if necessary. Further, they have small,
well-educated populations who will likely support gradual reforms and greater openness. And
they will increasingly expect a say in how their country is governed, even if this doesn’t include
overthrowing the monarchy. In his survey of democracy throughout the world, Kechichian has
found that
Ordinary Gulf citizens were routinely verbalizing some of their anxieties,
insisting on the need for openness, both on internal matters as well as key foreignpolicy issues.
‘Democracy’ is developing throughout the area, and while some G.C.C. ruling
families have faced the will of their electorates, progress if painfully slow. Still,
there is every reason to believe that the process itself will continue to empower
G.C.C. citizens to gradually assume a greater share of the burden of governance
(2004, p. 53).

Despite these advantages and pressures, change will not occur overnight. These are still
in many ways traditional societies that cherish stability and prosperity. Neither Gulf citizens nor
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Gulf monarchs want to see great unrest or instability in the name of democratization. When
asked, people in the region say they want “slow and incremental change to reduce resistance to
democratic ideals, eventually win over skeptics, and prevent a serious backlash that could stifle
future progress” (Ben-Meir 2006, p. 329). Rather than bemoan the slow pace of change in the
region, analysts and scholars would do better to look at what is happening and why. While
proceeding slowly may seem to serve the interests of the absolute monarch, it may also serve the
cause of long-term democratization. Rather than focusing on how democratization has
proceeded in other regions of the world, the scholarly community would do well to pay attention
to the unique (and possibly new-paradigm-creating) trajectory and progress occurring in the Gulf
States. Here, in the Persian Gulf region,
The evolution of greater power and responsibility of representative institutions is
a distinct possibility. Middle Eastern monarchies will not follow the same path
toward constitutional monarchy as did their European neighbors. However, if
representative institutions win political battles in shaping policies, over time
inertia for their greater power may emerge. . . . The future of democratization in
most Middle Eastern monarchies lies not in spectacular regime collapses or social
revolutions. Rather, budget debates, confidence votes of cabinets, and the
questioning of ministers are the likely paths toward the evolution of greater
democratization in monarchical authoritarian regimes (Lucas 2004, p. 117).
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